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I love retaliation; it’s in the Bible and people get it.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Like the pigs’ description of the animals in Orwell’s Animal 
Farm,2 all employment discrimination laws are equal, but some 
employment discrimination laws are more equal than others.  While 
it is unlawful for sex, race, color, national origin, and religion to even 
motivate employment decisions, after the Supreme Court’s 2013 
decision in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar,3 
retaliation, age,4 and, in all likelihood, disability may sometimes 
lawfully motivate employer conduct.5  In other words, while some 
level of employer discrimination based on age, disability, or 
retaliation is tolerated, no amount of employer discrimination based 
on the five other statutory protected classes is permitted.  Despite 
nearly identical statutory language, the Court has held that the 
protected classes must be litigated under different standards of 
proof.6  Nassar held that an employee-plaintiff alleging that he 
suffered adverse employment action as a form of retaliation must 
prove his case according to traditional principles of “but for” 
causation, not the more easily established causation test stated in 
Title VII.7 
Perhaps not surprisingly, within weeks of the Nassar holding, a 
bipartisan group of law-makers re-introduced parallel bills in the U.S. 
House of Representatives and the Senate, called the Protecting Older 
Workers against Discrimination Act (POWADA).8  POWADA, 
originally proposed in 2009 after the Supreme Court held that an 
employee’s age could motivate employer conduct,9 would expand the 
 
 1  Wayne Outten, Managing Partner, Outten & Golden, LLP, Remarks at New 
York University’s 62nd Annual Conference on Labor and Employment Law Initiatives 
and Proposals in the Obama Administration (June 5, 2009).  
 2  GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 133 (Signet Classic 1996) (1946) (“There was 
nothing there now except a single Commandment.  It ran: ‘ALL ANIMALS ARE 
EQUAL BUT SOME ANIMALS ARE MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS.’”).  
 3  133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013). 
 4  Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009). 
 5  Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2532–33. 
 6  Id.; see 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(m) (2011); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 
29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2012). 
 7  Id.; see 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(m) (2011).   
 8  H.R. 2852, 113th. Cong. (1st Sess. 2013).  
 9  Gross, 557 U.S. at 180. 
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so-called mixed-motive jury instruction to age, retaliation, and 
disability, and would allow plaintiffs, not judges, to decide which 
types of instruction the jury would receive.10 
While POWADA’s sponsors and the Court have staked out very 
different views on this issue,11 Congress and the Court seem to equally 
lack helpful data to inform their respective opinions.  The lack of 
data informing opinions is ironic, but unfortunately typical, 
considering that Nassar and POWADA are both attempting to inform 
areas noted for their stark absence of data germane to the interaction 
of legal rules in the employment discrimination context.12  
Consequently, regardless of whether Congress abrogates Nassar (and 
perhaps Gross), POWADA will remain flawed because either age and 
disability will be treated differently than other protected classes, or 
retaliation law will be so employee-friendly that employers will 
overcompensate in instances in which an employee complains about 
any type of unlawful conduct.  POWADA could make a bit more 
sense, however, if both Congress and the courts took relevant 
experimental social science evidence and its interaction with legal 
doctrine more seriously. 
More nuanced attention to burden of proof allocations is one 
important way to improve employment discrimination law.  Presently, 
two types of jury instructions are available: (1) the “pretext,” or “but-
for” instruction; and (2) the “mixed-motive” or “motivating-factor” 
instruction.13  These two jury instructions apply to at least three 
employment discrimination statutes: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
 
 10  Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, H.R. 3721, 111th Cong. 
(1st Sess. 2009). 
 11  See Press Release, Tom Harkin, U.S. Senator, Bipartisan Senate Legislation 
Seeks to Protect Older Workers from Discrimination (July 30, 2013), available at 
http://www.harkin.senate.gov/press/release.cfm?i=345436 (“The Supreme Court’s 
divisive holding in Gross has created uncertainty in our civil rights laws, making it 
incumbent on Congress to clarify our intent.” (quoting Patrick Leahy, U.S. 
Senator)).  
 12  The Federal Workforce: Observations on Protections From Discrimination 
and Reprisal for Whistleblowing, (May 9, 2001), available at   
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GAOREPORTS-GAO-01-
715T/html/GAOREPORTS-GAO-01-715T.htm (“Currently, because of the lack of 
data, the federal government lacks a clear picture of the volume of  discrimination 
and whistleblowing reprisal cases involving federal employees.”); Carolyn Shaw Bell, 
Comparable worth: how do we know it will work?, The Monthly Labor Review, 5, 5 (Dec. 
1985), http://blsweb1.psb.bls.gov/opub/mlr/1985/12/art2full.pdf (noting the 
“dearth of useful data” in related to employment discrimination). 
 13  See generally David Sherwyn & Michael Heise, The Gross Beast of Burden of Proof: 
Experimental Evidence on How the Burden of Proof Influences Employment Discrimination 
Case Outcomes, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 901, 905–15 (2010).   
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of 1964 (Title VII),14 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA),15 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).16  Each of 
the statutes prohibits retaliation against those who oppose 
discrimination based on any of the relevant protected classes, and 
those who participate in a government investigation (e.g., by the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or a state or municipal 
agency) or in discrimination litigation.17 
The mixed-motive jury instruction arose out of the Supreme 
Court’s Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins decision.18  The Civil Rights Act of 
1991 codified the mixed-motive jury instruction, made it significantly 
more plaintiff-friendly, and, for all intents and purposes, expanded its 
use so that mixed motive is now a misnomer and should be called 
“motivating-factor” instruction.19  Two subsequent Supreme Court 
cases, Gross and Nassar, held that the motivating-factor instruction 
does not apply to age20 or retaliation21 cases.  After Gross and Nassar, 
then, there is no legal basis to apply the motivating-factor instruction 
to ADA cases.  After all, it would make little sense for the Court to 
infer a “motivating-factor” instruction into the ADA after failing to do 
so for age and retaliation.  The ADA is similar to both retaliation and 
ADEA in that none of three laws specially allow for the motivating 
factor instruction (Congress did not amend the ADEA, did not 
address retaliation, and the ADA went into effect after the CRA of 
1991) and all use the term “because of.”  Thus, as of the writing of 
this Article, an employer motivated by race, color, sex, national 
origin, or religion, but who would have made the decision regardless 
of the protected class, is liable for discrimination and associated 
attorneys’ fees and costs.22  Alternatively, an employer motivated by 
age, disability, or retaliation, but who would have made the decision 
 
 14  Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2008) (protecting against 
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin). 
 15  Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2012) 
(protecting people over forty).  
 16  Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2011) (protecting 
people with disabilities). 
 17  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d); 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a).  
 18  490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion).  
 19  Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, § 2 (1991) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2008)) (“[T]he decision of the Supreme 
Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (2011) has weakened the 
scope and effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections . . . .”). 
 20  Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs. Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009). 
 21  Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2532–33 (2013). 
 22  See Sherwyn & Heise, supra note 13, at 930.  
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anyway is not liable for discrimination nor associated costs and fees. 
POWADA directly implicates the motivating-factor jury 
instruction by extending it to include age, disability, and retaliation.  
As explained below, the Supreme Court’s Gross and Nassar decisions 
pivot on a statutory construction approach that makes sense in a 
vacuum, but makes far less sense in the context of Price Waterhouse 
and the history of employment discrimination laws.  The Gross 
decision is further undermined because there is little support for 
distinguishing age, or disability for that matter, from Title VII.23  The 
nature of retaliation claims within the context of actual employment 
discrimination litigation, however, fundamentally differs from claims 
moored in other protected classes.  As well, these claims differ in a 
manner that will unduly tilt jurors in a direction favorable to 
employee assertions of employer retaliation.  Consequently, we argue 
that POWADA’s desire to extend the motivating-factor jury 
instruction to include employer retaliation claims is misguided as it 
ignores important differences that distinguish retaliation claims from 
other employer discrimination claims. 
To test our claim we replicated and slightly modified a prior jury 
experiment24 by substituting a retaliation claim for a national origin 
employment discrimination claim in an otherwise constant 
employment discrimination fact pattern.  Just over 40 percent of the 
mock jurors in the earlier study (2010) were persuaded by an 
employee’s claim that national origin motivated an employer’s 
adverse action.25  In the instant experiment, almost 60 percent of the 
mock jurors were persuaded by a retaliation claim holding constant 
the other salient parts of the fact pattern from the prior study.26  
Simply altering the nature of the employment discrimination claims 
(national origin versus retaliation) likely explains at least some of the 
observed increased likelihood of jurors concluding that the 
complaining employee successfully established a viable legal claim.  If 
this is so, then extending mixed-motive jury instructions to include 
retaliation claims, as contemplated by POWADA, is unlikely to resolve 
 
 23  See generally Lawrence D. Rosenthal, A Lack of “Motivation,” or Sound Legal 
Reasoning? Why Most Courts Are Not Applying Either Price Waterhouse’s or the 1991 Civil 
Rights Act’s Motivating-Factor Analysis to Title VII Retaliation Claims in a Post-Gross World 
(But Should), 64 ALA. L. REV. 1067 (2013).  At least one scholar, Lex K. Larson, 
concluded that the motivating-factor jury instruction does apply to retaliation claims.  
Id. at 1111–12 & n.85, 376–82. 
 24  See Sherwyn & Heise, supra note 13, at 926–47. 
 25  Sherwyn & Heise, supra note 13, at 937 Table 5. 
 26  See infra Part IV. 
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key problems challenging employment law doctrine and, worse still, 
may exacerbate other problems. 
Part II includes a brief history of the “but for” and “motivating 
factor” burden of proof schemes that dominate employment 
discrimination litigation.  Part III discusses the law of employer 
retaliation and argues why retaliation is fundamentally different from 
other protected employee classes.  Part IV presents results from our 
jury study in which we seek to experimentally assess the consequences 
of applying the motivating-factor jury instruction in the employer 
retaliation context.  Finally, Part V discusses a possible solution for 
the burden of proof conundrum as well as avenues for further 
productive empirical research in this area. 
II. THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN DISCRIMINATION CASES UNDER TITLE VII 
AND THE ADEA 
More comprehensive accounts of the “but for” and “motivating 
factor” schemes’ development can be found in other law review 
articles,27 including one by two of the authors.28  The abbreviated 
summary that follows seeks only to frame the main argument of this 
Article. 
Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA each expressly state that 
employers may not discriminate because of the certain employee 
characteristics protected by the statutes.29  These statutes do not go 
on to explain, however, how parties prove their case, which party 
bears the burden of proof, or how much, if any, employer 
discrimination is tolerated.  Thus, the courts developed the methods, 
burdens, and standards of proof in a series of Supreme Court and 
lower-court decisions,30 modified by Congress in the Civil Rights Act 
 
 27  See, e.g., Michael C. Harper, The Causation Standard in Federal Employment Law: 
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., and the Unfulfilled Promise of the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 69, 75–111 (2010).  See Robert Belton, Mixed-Motive Cases in 
Employment Discrimination Law Revisited: A Brief Updated View of the Swamp, 51 MERCER 
L. REV. 651 (2000), for a discussion of the evolution of the “motivating factor” 
framework.   
 28  See generally Sherwyn & Heise, supra note 13.   
 29  Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2008); Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2012); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
12112 (2011). 
 30  See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 909–915 & n.57 
(1973); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc, 530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000); St. 
Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. 
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). 
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of 1991, and then subsequently refined by Desert Palace, Inc. v Costa,31 
Gross, Nassar, and a host of lower court decisions.32  To understand 
the current state of the burden of proof assignment, it is necessary to 
understand its evolution, beginning with the Court’s holding in 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.33 
A. A Brief History 
In McDonnell Douglas, the Court established the method of proof 
in discrimination cases.  The Court held that to prove discrimination, 
employees first had to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.  
To prove a prima facie case, employees had to establish that: (1) they 
belonged to a protected class; (2) they were minimally qualified for 
the position in question and that they applied for the position; (3) 
they suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that the job 
remained open.34  The fourth element was fact-specific to the 
McDonnell Douglas case as it was a “failure to hire” case and the 
allegations occurred before the company filled the position.35  Thus, 
the Court’s framework focused on the fact that the company 
continued to look for employees after rejecting the plaintiff and 
made that the fourth element.36  Over the years, courts have 
expanded the fourth element to address situations where a company 
hired (or fired) an employee other than the plaintiff.  In such cases, 
the fourth element is either: (1) the job went to an employee outside 
the plaintiff’s protected class,37 or (2) in a discharge case, that 
 
 31  539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
 32  For cases pre-Costa, see Stella v. Minetta, 284 F.3d 135, 146 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
(holding that it is not necessary for a plaintiff to establish that she was replaced by a 
person outside of her protected class to satisfy the burden under McDonnell Douglas); 
Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 158 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a 
prima facie case may exist even if one white worker is replaced by another white 
worker); Hong v. Children’s Mem’l Hosp., 993 F.2d 1257, 1262 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(holding that Title VII plaintiff must show satisfactory work at the time of discharge 
to state a prima facie case); Johnson v. Grp. Health Plan, Inc., 994 F.2d 543, 546 (8th 
Cir. 1992) (holding that ADEA plaintiff must show satisfactory work at the time of 
discharge to state a prima facie case). 
 33  411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 34  Id. at 802 (“This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial 
minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was 
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, 
after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek 
applicants from persons of complainant’s qualifications.”). 
 35  Id. at 801–02 & n.13.  
 36  Id.  
 37  See, e.g., Fisher v. Pharmacia & Upjohn, 225 F.3d 915, 918–19 (8th Cir. 2000) 
(reversing the district court’s entry of summary judgment for the employer where the 
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similarly situated employees outside the protected class engaged in 
similar conduct, but were treated differently.38 
The establishment of a prima facie case creates a rebuttable 
presumption that the employer discriminated.39  Employers may 
refute this presumption by “producing (not proving)” a legitimate, 
non-discriminatory reason for the decision.40  After an employer 
satisfies this very low burden, the employee can, in turn, prove 
discrimination by establishing that the real reason for the decision 
was discrimination or that the reason articulated by the employer was 
pretextual, and hence, unworthy of belief.41 
The framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas was refined by 
several subsequent decisions.42  In Texas Department of Community 
Affairs v. Burdine,43 the Court of Appeals explicitly held that the 
employer had to prove that: (1) the articulated reason was the real 
reason for the decision; and (2) the person hired was more qualified 
than the plaintiff.44  The Supreme Court rejected this expanded, or 
inaccurate, interpretation of McDonnell Douglas and reiterated that: 
(1) the employer need only articulate a non-discriminatory reason 
and; (2) there was no obligation to hire the best candidate for a job.45  
Instead, the employer simply could not discriminate.46  For some 
reason, courts and employment professionals use the term 
“legitimate non-discriminatory reason.”47  Such language is 
redundant, however, because a reason is legitimate if it is non-
 
plaintiff was a member of an age protected group and was replaced by younger 
individuals.); Brown v. McLean, 159 F.3d 898, 905 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding that 
plaintiff did not make out his prima facie case as he was replaced by another male).  
 38  See Silvera v. Orange Cnty. Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 1253, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001) (“In 
determining whether employees are similarly situated for purposes of establishing a 
prima facie case, it is necessary to consider whether the employees are involved in or 
accused of the same or similar conduct and are disciplined in different way.”) 
(quoting Jones v. Bessemer Carraway Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 
1998).  Furthermore, the courts recognized that some employees may not apply for 
the jobs and thus, prong two was modified as well.  
 39  McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
 40  Id.  
 41  Id. at 804–07. 
 42  See generally Tex. Dep’t Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); St. 
Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing 
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000). 
 43  450 U.S. at 251–52.   
 44  Id. at 256–59.   
 45  Id.  
 46  Id. at 257. 
 47  See, e.g., id. at 252.  
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discriminatory.  Thus, firing employees because of the color of their 
shirts, their favorite sports teams, or their taste in music is non-
discriminatory and legitimate even if such characteristics have no 
effect on the employees’ ability to do their jobs.  Employers who 
engage in such decision making are human resource professionals’ 
worst nightmares and provide opportunities for union organizers, but 
are squarely within the law.48 
In 1989, the Supreme Court confronted another type of 
employment discrimination—the so-called mixed-motive case.  In 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,49 the firm denied Ann Hopkins a 
promotion to partnership on two separate occasions, despite her 
excellent job performance, because of her allegedly poor 
interpersonal skills.50  After the initial decision, some of the firm’s 
partners counseled Hopkins that in order to improve her chances of 
being promoted, she should wear makeup, get her hair done, stop 
cursing, and walk, talk, and act in a more “feminine” manner.51  
Hopkins argued that these statements were evidence of sexual 
discrimination and that this evidence, along with her strong 
performance, proved that the denial of partnership was unlawful.  
The employer conceded that the plaintiff’s performance was strong, 
but that the firm would not  promote Hopkins, regardless of her skills 
because of her poor interpersonal skills and because she was difficult 
to get along with52 
The Court found that the employer had both legitimate (the 
interpersonal skills) and illegitimate (sex-based discriminatory 
standards applied only to female associates) reasons for its conduct.53  
The Price Waterhouse Court made it seem like this was a unique 
 
 48  Employment at-will is the standard in almost all states and thus, employers 
have the right to hire and fire whomever they wish for any reasons they want as long 
as the reasons do not violate specific laws.  Thus, a reason that is non-discriminatory 
is legitimate even if illogical, unfair, and/or seemingly absurd.  
 49  490 U.S. 228 (1989).   
 50  Id. at 231–36.   
 51  Id. at 235.   
 52  Id. at 231–36.  Many partners simply did not get along with Hopkins and 
stated that “[s]he tended to alienate the staff in that she was extremely overbearing. 
Ann needs improvement in her interpersonal skills.”  Cynthia Estlund, The Story of 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STORIES 65, 69 (Joel 
Wm. Friedman ed., 2006).  Further, partners were bothered by “the arrogance and 
self-centered attitude that Ann projects.”  Id. at 70.  Other partners saw her positive 
attributes and her negatives, “I found her to be (a) singularly dedicated, (b) rather 
unpleasant.”  Id.  
 53  Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 234–35 (plurality opinion). 
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situation.54  The reality of legitimate and illegitimate motives is likely 
not as unique as the availability of evidence of both kinds of employer 
motivation.  It was the availability of both legitimate and illegitimate 
evidence of employer motivation for the adverse employment action 
against the plaintiff that made Price Waterhouse unique.  A single-issue 
case would mean that the employer was completely motivated by 
lawful reasons or completely motivated by unlawful reasons.  Such an 
implication, however, conflicts with theories of human behavior that 
tend to advance the notion of complex and multi-faceted motivations 
in almost all decisions.55  Further, this simplified view of employment 
decision making does not accurately account for agency. It is quite 
possible, and more likely the case in larger organizations, for multiple 
agents to possess different motives in rendering employment 
decisions.  For instance, a manager might be motivated to terminate 
an employee because of her gender, but a human resources 
department might be motivated only by that employee’s poor 
interpersonal skills. 
The Court produced no majority opinion in Price Waterhouse.56  
Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion established a new scheme for 
proving discrimination.  Under the plurality opinion, plaintiffs satisfy 
their burden by proving that discrimination was a motivating part of 
the employer’s decision.57  The employer, according to Brennan’s 
opinion, could escape liability by proving that it would have made the 
same decisions regardless of the protected class.58 
While six justices agreed with Brennan’s two-prong and true 
burden-shifting approach, they did not agree on the standard needed 
for a case to fall into this classification.59  Accordingly, Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence was widely accepted as the holding in the 
 
 54  See id. at 241 (“It is difficult for us to imagine that, in the simple words 
‘because of,’ Congress meant to obligate a plaintiff to identify the precise causal role 
played by legitimate and illegitimate motivations in the employment decision she 
challenges.”).  
 55  See, e.g., Michael I. Norton et al., Mixed Motives and Racial Bias: The Impact of 
Legitimate and Illegitimate Criteria on Decision Making, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 36, 
47 (2006) (finding that decision makers unconsciously rely on racial information in 
their decisions but mask its influence by inflating the value of non-racial 
justifications); Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming McDonnell Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
109, 150–51 & n.142 (2007).   
 56  Price Waterhouse, 490 U. S. 228 (plurality opinion). 
 57  Id. at 240–42 (plurality opinion). 
 58  Id. (plurality opinion). 
 59  Price Waterhouse, 490 U. S. at 261 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see Marks v. 
United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (noting that the holding of the Court is the 
narrowest point on which five justices agree). 
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case.60  O’Connor’s concurrence states that the shift in the burden of 
proof inherent in the mixed-motive analysis is only available when the 
employee proves, with direct evidence, that the protected class was a 
substantial factor in the employer’s decision.61  Like Brennan’s 
opinion, O’Connor’s holding allowed employers to escape liability if 
they could prove that they would have made the same decision 
regardless of the protected class.  The dissenting justices opposed 
burden shifting and argued that the plaintiff always bore the burden 
of proving that discrimination was the “but for” cause of an 
employer’s decision.62  In addition to arguing for a “but for” standard, 
the dissenting justices contended that the holding created 
unnecessary confusion for employers and courts.63 
Both of these arguments have merit.64  First, in the prior term, 
the Court held in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust65 that the burden 
of proof did not shift in adverse impact cases, and that courts and 
commentators had misinterpreted Griggs v. Duke Power Co.66 for close 
to twenty years.  Thus, there was no real precedent for shifting the 
burden.  Second, it is not easy to put every piece of evidence into a 
direct or circumstantial box.  There were numerous cases in which 
parties argued whether certain evidence could be considered direct 
evidence.67  Last, the term “substantial” eludes an easy, consistent 
 
 60  See, e.g., Kriss v. Sprint Commc’ns Co., 58 F.3d 1276, 1282 (8th Cir. 1995); 
Hook v. Ernst & Young, 28 F.3d 366, 373–74 (3d Cir. 1994); Ostrowski v. Atlantic 
Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171, (2d Cir. 1992).  
 61  Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276–78 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 62  Id. at 282–84 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 63  Id. at 286–93. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 64  For the differing definitions of “direct evidence,” see Shorter v. ICG Holdings, 
Inc., 188 F.3d 1204, 1207 (10th Cir. 1999); Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1141–42 
(4th Cir. 1995); Ostrowski v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 181–83 (2d Cir. 1992); 
see generally Belton, supra note 27. 
 65  487 U.S. 977 (1988).   
 66  401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding that a policy requiring a high school education 
and the passing of standardized tests as employment conditions though neutral on its 
face was discriminatory” because it disparately impacted blacks).   
 67  See Tristin K. Green, Making Sense of the McDonnell Douglas Framework: 
Circumstantial Evidence and Proof of Disparate Treatment Under Title VII, 87 CAL. L. REV. 
983, 1005 n.122 (1999) (citing Trans World Airlines, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (finding a 
policy to constitute direct evidence of a violation of the ADEA in which it made the 
transfer method available to a disqualified captain dependent on age; City of Los 
Angeles Dep’t. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 705 (1978) (finding a 
policy to constitute direct evidence of discrimination in which it required that female 
employees make larger contributions to a pension fund; Grant v. Hazelett Strip-
Casting Corp., 880 F.2d 1564, 1569 (2d Cir. 1989) (treating a memorandum as direct 
evidence of discrimination where the company president stated that he wanted to 
hire a young man between the ages of thirty and forty). 
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definition. Thus, in some cases, seemingly meaningless words or even 
a court reporter’s error effectively determined the burden proof.68  
Despite these (and other) problems, McDonnell Douglas, Burdine, and 
Price Waterhouse, when cobbled together, created a relatively 
straightforward framework that shaped employment discrimination 
claims.  Cases with direct evidence in which discrimination played a 
substantial role were labeled “mixed motive.”  Cases with 
circumstantial or no evidence at all were analyzed under the “but for” 
or “pretext” model.  This framework, however, did not last long. 
In St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks,69 the plaintiff alleged that he 
was terminated because of his race.70  The employer argued that it 
terminated Hicks for violating rules, failing to supervise subordinates, 
and for verbally threatening another employee.71  The district court 
held that the articulated reasons were not true, but rather that the 
termination was personal and that the plaintiff failed to prove that 
race was the real reason behind the decision.72  Accordingly, the 
district court found for the employer.73  On appeal, the Eighth Circuit 
reversed and held that when the proffered reasons are found to be 
untrue, the employee has proven pretext and the plaintiff wins as a 
matter of law.74  The Supreme Court reversed and held that the 
plaintiff will prevail, as a matter of law, only if the employee proves 
pretext and provides evidence that the real reason was 
discrimination.75  Many commentators refer to this as “pretext plus.”76  
Despite Justice Souter’s assertions in his dissent, the case expressly 
stated that fact finders were free to infer discrimination from a 
finding of pretext, but they did not have to do so.77  Still, the reaction 
 
 68  For how courts have analyzed certain “code” words, see Ash v. Tyson Foods, 
Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456 (2006) (per curiam) (holding that an employer referring to 
African American employees as “boy” potentially showed discriminatory animus); 
McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1116–17 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that “a 
mere offensive utterance” may be evidence of a hostile work environment). In Austin 
v. Cornell University, 891 F. Supp. 740 (N.D.N.Y. 1995), a deponent responded to the 
question: “so you said you wanted some fresh blood?” with the question: “I did?”  The 
court reporter missed the inflection and the transcript stated: “I did.”  The court 
allowed a mixed motive instruction based on the deposition.  
 69  509 U.S. 502 (1993).   
 70  Id. at 505.   
 71  Id.   
 72  Id. at 508. 
 73  Id.   
 74  Id. at 508–09. 
 75  Hicks, 509 U.S. at 514–16.   
 76  See id. at 535–36 (Souter, J., dissenting).   
 77  Id. at 511.   
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to Hicks from employee rights advocates was swift and strong.  
Employee advocates contended that by requiring evidence of 
discrimination, Hicks made prevailing in discrimination cases nearly 
impossible for employees.78  While impossible may be too strong, 
Hicks did, in fact, alter the terrain of employment discrimination’s 
rights assertion. 
After Hicks, plaintiffs without evidence could only prevail if fact 
finders inferred discrimination from a finding of pretext.79  In other 
words, fact finders are free to conclude that while the proffered 
 
 78  See, e.g., Civil Rights Standards Restoration Act, S. 1776, 103d Cong. (1st Sess. 
1993) (proposing an amendment to the Revised Statutes § 1979 that would restore 
the pre-Hicks plaintiff’s burden in intentional discrimination cases); Employment 
Discrimination Evidentiary Amendment of 1993, H.R. 2787, 103d Cong. (1st Sess. 
1993) (proposing an amendment to Title VII that would override the majority 
holding in Hicks); Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After 
Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229 (1995); Note, Title VII—Burden of Persuasion in Disparate 
Treatment Cases, 107 HARV. L. REV. 342, 348 (1993) (arguing that requiring the 
plaintiff to show direct evidence of intent “will severely curtail the ability of many 
Title VII plaintiffs to succeed on their disparate treatment claims”); Sherie L. Coons, 
Comment, Proving Disparate Treatment After St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks: Is 
Anything Left of McDonnell Douglas?, 19 J. CORP. L. 379, 408 (1994) (“The Hicks 
majority’s holding is ill-conceived and furthers unsound policy because [it] . . . places 
an impossible burden of persuasion on plaintiffs . . . .”); Derrick L. Horner, Recent 
Development, Toward Clarifying the Ambiguity of Merging Burdens—St. Mary’s Honor 
Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993), 11 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 205, 213 (1994) 
(concluding that Hicks confronts plaintiffs with an “impossible burden of having to 
disprove any reason for the employer’s action a factfinder might see sketched in the 
record.”); Shannon R. Joseph, Note, Employment Discrimination: Shouldering the Burden 
of Proof After St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 963, 988–89 
(1994) (contrasting civil rights attorneys’ reactions to Hicks with that of management 
attorneys and evaluating proposed legislation attempting to overturn Hicks); Michael 
C. McPhillips, Note, St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks: The Casual Abandonment of Title 
VII Precedent, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 1045, 1066 (1994) (“[T]he court’s newly-developed 
burdens will make it impossible for many plaintiffs to get beyond summary 
judgment . . . [and] might chill their initiation of legitimate claims.”); Louis M. 
Rappaport, Note, St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks: Has the Supreme Court Turned its 
Back on Title VII by Rejecting “Pretext-Only?”, 39 VILL. L. REV. 123 (1994); Ronald A. 
Schmidt, Note, The Plaintiff’s Burden in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases: 
Discrimination Vel Non—St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993), 73 
NEB. L. REV. 953, 976–81 (1994) (summarizing criticism of Hicks but concluding that 
a Hicks plaintiff bears no greater burden than that of any other civil plaintiff); EEOC 
Urges Congress to Overturn Supreme Court’s 1993 Hicks Decision, 1993 DAILY LAB. REP. 
(BNA), Oct. 7, 1993, at D-7 (quoting EEOC Chairman as saying of post-Hicks 
litigation, “it may be impossible to prove discrimination in the absence of direct 
evidence, which is so rarely available”); Management, Civil Rights Attorneys Differ on 
Effect of Hicks Decision, 1993 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), July 2, 1993, at D-26 (quoting 
numerous employee groups characterizing the decision as a “hard blow to civil rights 
advocates” and calling for a legislative response). 
 79  See Malamud, supra note 78 at 2243.  
SHERWYN HEISE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/2014  12:11 PM 
468 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:455 
 
reason is unworthy of belief, the employer did not discriminate. In 
such instances, fact finders may find for employers.  Assuming that 
most plaintiffs’ lawyers work on a contingency fee arrangement, and 
that they are rationally self-interested, it makes little sense for lawyers 
to take cases in which they can satisfy their burden of proving pretext, 
but can still end up with no damages or costs and fees assessments.  
Put simply, betting on such an inference is a risky proposition for 
plaintiffs’ lawyers.  Professor Samuel Estreicher, one of the nation’s 
leading experts on ADR and outspoken supporter of arbitration in 
employment disputes, aptly refers to cases without evidence as 
“orphan” cases because they are unlikely able to find a lawyer to 
adopt them.80 
After Hicks, one would expect that plaintiffs’ lawyers would take 
cases with direct evidence and ask for the mixed-motive jury 
instruction, take cases with circumstantial evidence and accept the 
pretext or but for instruction, and avoid cases with insufficient 
evidence.  Plaintiffs’ preference for mixed-motive cases should have 
increased dramatically after the passage of the Civil Rights Act (CRA) 
of 1991.81 
After the CRA of 1991, the distinction between mixed motive 
and pretext changed from a theoretical one regarding the effect of 
the burden of proof to a more tangible difference in available 
damages. In addition to providing for jury trials in Title VII cases,82 
codifying the concept of, and altering the burden of proof in, 
disparate impact cases,83 and adding punitive and compensatory 
damages,84 the CRA of 1991 partially codified and partially 
overturned Price Waterhouse’s mixed-motive scheme.  First, the CRA of 
1991 recognized that in addition to intentional discrimination 
(disparate treatment) there is a second type of discrimination – 
unintentional discrimination known as disparate (or adverse) impact: 
(1) the plaintiff can demonstrate a disparate impact on the basis of a 
protected class and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the 
impact is job related and “consistent with business necessity,” or (2) 
the plaintiff can demonstrate that the respondent refused to 
 
 80  See Robin Pogrebin & Edward Klaris, The Rules of the Game, THE L. SCH., 
Autumn 2006, at 25, 34, available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default
/files/ECM_PRO_061129.pdf.  
 81  Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, § 102 (1991) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2011)). 
 82  § 102(c) (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (2011)). 
 83  § 105 (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2011)). 
 84  § 102(b) (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (2011)). 
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implement an “alternative employment practice.”85  Next, the CRA of 
1991 altered the mixed-motive scheme.  Under the CRA of 1991, the 
plaintiff can satisfy the first prong and thus, shift the burden of proof 
if the protected class is a motivating (as opposed to a substantial) 
factor in the employer decision.86  Further, the employer does not 
escape liability if it proves that it would have made the decision 
regardless of the protected class.87  Instead, the judge may award such 
plaintiffs a declaratory judgment and costs and attorney fees if they 
can satisfy the first prong of the two-prong mixed-motive test.88  
Employers unable to satisfy the second prong are subject to back pay, 
reinstatement, punitive damages, compensatory damages, and are 
also liable for costs and fees.89 
As to be expected, the CRA of 1991 contained statutory gaps.  
Two of these gaps directly affected the mixed-motive instruction and 
the burden of proof.  One was easily and logically decided.  The 
other is a source of contention without which there would be no 
need for most of the scholarship on this topic.  First, the CRA of 1991 
did not distinguish between circumstantial and direct evidence.  This 
would be fine if the statute stated that the type of evidence was 
irrelevant.  It did not do this.  Courts were split as to whether 
O’Connor’s direct evidence requirement survived the CRA of 1991.90  
Second, the CRA of 1991 did not expressly amend the ADEA or 
mention retaliation, leaving another open question: did the new 
mixed-motive damage scheme apply to age, retaliation, and, 
subsequently, the ADA?91 It took the Supreme Court twelve years to 
answer the direct evidence question,92 seventeen years to resolve the 
age question,93 and twenty-one years to answer the retaliation 
question.94  Plaintiffs cheered the first ruling,95 while employers 
 
 85  § 105(a) (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2011)); see 
also The Civil Rights Act of 1991, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov
/eeoc/history/35th/1990s/civilrights.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2013). 
 86  § 107(a) (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2011)). 
 87  Id.  (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2011)). 
 88  Id. (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) (2011)). 
 89  Id. (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2011)). 
 90  See Sherwyn & Heise, supra note 13 at 918–19 & nn.109–15 (discussing the 
circuit split over whether McDonnell Douglas applied to mixed-motive cases).  
 91  Congress passed the ADA one year before the CRA of 1991.  
 92  Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (holding that there was no 
need for direct evidence in order to obtain the mixed motive instruction). 
 93  Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs. Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009). 
 94  Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013). 
 95  See Jeffrey A. Van Detta, “Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Roi!”: An Essay on the Quiet 
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exhaled a sigh of relief after the second and third.96  The Court has 
still not expressly ruled on the ADA.97 
In Costa the Court posed and answered a simple question: does 
the CRA of 1991 require plaintiffs to provide direct evidence that 
discrimination was a substantial factor in the employer’s decision to 
receive a mixed-motive instruction?98  The answer is no.99  Both the 
majority opinion and Justice O’Connor’s concurrence state that the 
only conclusion to be drawn from Congress’ replacement of the term 
“substantial” with “motivating” and its failure to mention direct 
evidence is that any evidence that discrimination motivated the 
employer is enough to warrant a mixed-motive instruction.100  Along 
with opening the mixed-motive instruction to a significant number of 
cases, Costa destroyed the employment discrimination litigation 
framework that had developed over time by the lower courts.  After 
Costa, pretext cases were limited to situations in which there was no 
evidence.  As stated above, however, because plaintiffs’ lawyers should 
be reluctant to take these “orphan” cases, it seemed that all cases 
transmogrified into mixed-motive cases.101  Because of its widespread 
use, the term “mixed motive” should be replaced by “motivating 
factor.” 
All cases did not, however, become motivating-factor cases102 for 
 
Demise of McDonnell Douglas and the Transformation of Every Title VII Case After Desert 
Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a “Mixed-Motives” Case, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 71, 79 (2003) 
(“[T]he quiet little revolution started in Costa will be one of the most significant 
advances for civil rights enforcement in the twenty-first century.”).  
 96  See David G. Savage, Age Bias Much Harder To Prove; The Supreme Court Shifts the 
Burden of Proof to the Worker Making the Claim. Businesses Cheer., L.A. TIMES, June 19, 
2009, at A1 (“Businesses applauded the decision in Gross v. FBL Financial 
Services . . . .”); see also Leigh A. Van Ostrand, Note, A Close Look at ADEA Mixed-
Motive Claims and Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 399 
(2009).  
 97  It seems logical that, absent Congressional intervention, courts will follow the 
Court in ADA cases. 
 98  Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 92 (2003).  
 99  Id. at 101–02 (“[D]irect evidence of discrimination is not required in mixed-
motive cases . . . .”).  
 100  See id. at 102 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
 101  See Kenneth R. Davis, Price-Fixing: Refining the Price Waterhouse Standard and 
Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 859, 861 (2004); Henry L. 
Chambers, Jr., The Effect of Eliminating Distinctions Among Title VII Disparate Treatment 
Cases, 57 SMU L. REV. 83, 102–03 (2004).  For further insight into the debate, see 
William R. Corbett, McDonnell Douglas, 1973-2003: May You Rest in Peace?, 6 U. PA. J. 
LAB. & EMP. L. 199, 212–19 (2003); Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: 
Price Waterhouse is Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887 (2004).  
 102  Reports of McDonnell Douglas’ death were greatly exaggerated.  In fact, a Lexis 
search conducted by Professor Prenkert found that in the six-month period between 
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two reasons.  First, plaintiffs’ lawyers were reluctant to ask for the 
instruction.  Lawyers representing employers report that they have 
had numerous cases in which the motivating-factor instruction is 
proper, but the employee’s counsel did not ask for the instruction.103  
These lawyers surmised that the instruction can be confusing and 
that award of costs and fees, but no damages, is difficult to explain to 
clients. 
Second, courts simply did not know if the motivating factor 
applied to ADEA, retaliation, and ADA cases. McDonnell Douglas and 
its progeny’s burden-shifting scheme had always applied to ADEA 
and retaliation cases.104  Indeed, after Price Waterhouse and before the 
CRA of 1991, the mixed-motive instruction was available in age 
cases.105  The CRA, however, did not amend the ADEA or discuss 
retaliation.106  This placed courts in a difficult situation: apply the 
CRA of 1991 to age and retaliation cases despite the lack of 
Congressional guidance; apply Price Waterhouse, which had been 
modified by the CRA of 1991; or hold that after Congress codified 
and strengthened the mixed-motive instruction in race, sex, color, 
national origin, and religion cases, Congress intended to force age 
and retaliation cases to be labeled single motive cases.  In choosing 
this last option, courts would effectively hold that Congress intended 
to outlaw motivation based on the five classes protected by Title VII, 
but allow it in age, retaliation and likely ADA cases. 
Somewhat shockingly, the Court in Gross and Nassar held that 
 
December 2006 to May  2007, courts used the McDonnell Douglas framework in over 
400 cases.  Jamie Darin Prenkert, The Role of Second-Order Uniformity in Disparate 
Treatment Law: McDonnell Douglas’s Longevity and the Mixed-Motives Mess, 45 AMER. 
BUS. L.J. 511, 538 n.142 (2008).  
 103  Proskauer’s Joe Baumgarten stated such at the Cornell Labor & Employment 
Roundtable in May of 2007 and the other lawyers present, including Gregg Gilman 
(Davis & Gilbert), Ilene Berman (Taylor English), and Paul Wagner (Stokes Wagner) 
agreed.  This Annual Roundtable began in 2002 and features partners from well-
respected labor and employment law firms, in-house counsel, and professors from 
several different law firms.  See Labor and Employment Roundtable, CORNELL U. SCH. 
HOTEL ADMIN., http://www.hotelschool.cornell.edu/research/chr/events
/roundtables/recent/labor.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).   
 104  A retaliation claim involves different prima facie elements: (1) did the 
employee engage in a protected expression; (2) was the employee discriminated 
against again; and (3) is there a link between elements one and two.  See Gonzalez v. 
Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co., 133 F.3d 1025, 1035 (7th Cir. 1998).  At this point the 
burdens for retaliation are identical to that in McDonnell Douglas.  See id.  
 105  See, e.g., Visser v. Packer Eng’g Assocs., Inc., 924 F.2d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(referring to similar cases as “mixed motive age discrimination” cases).   
 106  Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102 (1991) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2011)).  
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Congress’ intent is found in the third option above.  What makes this 
problematic is that the Court focuses on the fact that both the ADEA 
and the retaliation provision of Title VII use the phrase “because 
of.”107  The Court has now held twice that such language is evidence 
of Congressional intent to require but-for causation.  The problem is 
that Title VII uses the exact same language.108  The Court in Price 
Waterhouse interpreted Title VII’s language to create the mixed-
motive scheme.109  After the mixed-motive scheme was codified and 
strengthened by CRA 1991, the Court held that the same language 
requires but-for proof in three other statutes.110  This inconsistency in 
interpretation is difficult to understand or justify. 
In a prior article, two of this Article’s authors discussed how the 
two schemes are used and whether they should both still be used.111  
Again, it is beyond the scope of this Article to report in detail how the 
two schemes are, and if they should be, applied.  It is, however, 
important to know that McDonnell Douglas, in most jurisdictions, is 
used in the summary judgment phase only112 and is deemed no longer 
relevant in cases that go to trial.113  Instead, the jury instruction simply 
 
 107  Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs. Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 183 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he Court interprets the words ‘because of’ in the ADEA as colloquial shorthand 
for ‘but-for’ causation.” (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 
(1989) (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted))); Univ. of Tex. Sw. 
Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2545 (2013). (“The meaning of ‘because’ in Title 
VII’s retaliation provision should be read to mean just what the Court held ‘because’ 
means for ADEA-liability purposes.”) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 108  Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–166, §105(a) (1991) (codified as 
amended in scattered subsections of 42 U.S.C. § 21) (making it unlawful to engage in 
discrimination “because of race, color, religion sex, or national origin”).  
 109  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240–41 (1989) (plurality opinion).  
 110  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2011) (“[T]o discriminate against any individual 
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .”).  
 111  See generally Sherwyn & Heise, supra note 13. 
 112  See Kristina N. Klein, Note, Oasis or Mirage? Desert Palace and Its Impact on the 
Summary Judgment Landscape, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1177, 1186–87 (2006) (discussing 
McDonnell Douglas in the context of summary judgment). 
 113  See Sandra F. Sperino, Recreating Diversity in Employment Law by Debunking the 
Myth of the McDonnell Douglas Monolith, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 349, 376–78 (2007) 
(chronicling the case law of the circuits in great detail); See also Whittington v. 
Nordam Grp. Inc., 429 F.3d 986, 997–98 (10th Cir. 2005); Kanida v. Gulf Coast Med. 
Pers. LP, 363 F.3d 568, 576 (5th Cir. 2004); Sanders v. N.Y. City Human Res. Admin., 
361 F.3d 749, 758 (2d Cir. 2004); Sanghvi v. City of Claremont, 328 F.3d 532, 539–40 
(9th Cir. 2003); Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 1317, 1322 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(“We stress that it is unnecessary and inappropriate to instruct the jury on the 
McDonnell Douglas analysis.”); Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 
1994); Mullen v. Princess Anne Volunteer Fire Co., 853 F.2d 1130, 1137 (4th Cir. 
1988) (arguing that the “shifting burdens of production of Burdine . . . are beyond 
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asks the jurors to decide if the employer made its decision “because 
of” the protected class.114  This is an odd result jurisprudentially 
speaking, to say the least. Conversely, the entire motivating-factor 
scheme, when applied, has always been fully present in the jury 
instruction.115  After Costa, however, some courts used the motivating 
factor scheme in summary judgments while others refused to do so.116 
B. The Current and Proposed State of Employment Discrimination 
Law 
Title VII plaintiffs may request the motivating-factor instruction, 
and they should.  Judges, however, can choose whether or not to give 
the instruction.117  The judicial decision as to whether a case is a 
 
the function and expertise of the jury” as well as “overly complex”). 
 114  See Watson v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 207 F.3d 207, 221–22 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(holding that it is improper to instruct the jury on the McDonnell Douglas burden 
shifting scheme, but it is proper “to instruct the jury that it may consider whether the 
factual predicates necessary to establish the prima facie case have been shown”); 
Walther v. Lone Star Gas Co., 952 F.2d 119, 127 (5th Cir. 1992) (“Instructing the jury 
on the elements of a prima facie case, presumptions, and the shifting burden of 
proof is unnecessary and confusing. Instead, the court should instruct the jury to 
consider the ultimate question of whether defendant terminated plaintiff because of 
his age.”); but see Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 167 & n.9 (6th Cir. 1993) 
(holding that it was proper to “guid[e] the jury through a three-stage order of proof 
as opposed to instructing the jury solely on the ultimate issue of sex discrimination”), 
abrogated on other grounds by Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010); see also Brown 
v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 338 F.3d 586, 595–99 (6th Cir. 2003) (Clay, J., 
concurring); Faulkner v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 3 F.3d 1419, 1425–26 & n.3 (10th 
Cir. 1993); Lynch v. Belden & Co., 882 F.2d 262, 269 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[I]t was 
proper for the district court to instruct the jury as to the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine 
formula for evaluating indirect evidence.”); Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 832 
F.2d 194, 200 (1st Cir. 1987) (“[T]he district court was correct in using the 
[McDonnell Douglas] framework in the instructions to the jury.”), abrogated on other 
grounds by Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 115  See, e.g., Donovan v. Milk Mktg. Inc., 243 F.3d 584, 586 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(“[W]hen the jury might reasonably conclude on the evidence that both illegal 
discrimination and legitimate non-discriminatory reasons were present in an 
employer’s decision-making process, the court may charge the jury on mixed-
motivation in accordance with Price Waterhouse.”). 
 116  See generally Kerry S. Acocella, Note, Out with the Old and in with the New: The 
Second Circuit Shows It’s Time for the Supreme Court to Finally Overrule McDonnell 
Douglas, 11 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 125 (2004). 
 117  See, e.g., Sukenic v. County of Maricopa, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31837 (D. Az 
2004) stating: 
In the last paragraph of the Court’s Opinion in Costa, the Court 
explicitly adopted a standard equivalent to Rule 50(a), Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, for judgment as a matter of law in jury trials, for 
determining if a plaintiff was entitled to obtain a mixed-motive 
instruction. Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. at 101, 123 S. Ct. at 2155.  
We contend that having the court “label” the case is waste of time.  
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motivating factor case could best be described as difficult to 
categorize and understand.  In every case that makes it to trial, the 
employee alleges discrimination and the employer claims that the 
employee deserved the adverse employment action for non-
discriminatory reasons.  One of three truths should emerge: (1) the 
employer discriminated; (2) the employer did not discriminate 
against the employee; or (3) there were both legitimate and 
illegitimate reasons operating simultaneously.  Deciding which of the 
three occurred is the job of the jury118 and thus, the POWADA 
correctly allows any discrimination plaintiff to select their preferred 
scheme.119  The problem with POWADA is that it includes retaliation 
plaintiffs.120 Below, we explain from a doctrinal standpoint why 
retaliation is like the Orwellian quote from Animal Farm mentioned at 
the beginning of the Article—it is equal but somehow more equal 
 
Such analysis is a waste of time because if the employee has no 
evidence of discrimination, the court should dismiss the case.  If the 
employer has no evidence of legitimate reasons, the court should find 
for the employee. In all other cases, the court should provide a mixed 
motive instruction.  More problematic is that having a judge label a 
case as “mixed motive” presupposed the holding of the jury.  
Accordingly, the jury instruction should be referred to as the 
motivating factor instruction.  Because it is the role of the jury to 
determine whether the evidence presented by each side is credible, it 
seems clear that all discrimination plaintiffs should be allowed to prove 
and all juries should decide their cases, under the same instruction.  
 118  References to Price Waterhouse as a “mixed-motive” case imply that McDonnell 
Douglas cases are “single-motive” cases.  This distinction makes little or no sense.  
First, absent certain reprehensible behavior, such as workplace violence, it is illogical 
to think that sophisticated business decision makers hire, fire, promote, or demote 
people for any individual reason.  Instead, human resources departments have multi-
step procedures to make such decisions.  It is even harder to believe that forty-five 
years after Title VII, in a multi-cultural society where diversity is often easily seen and 
judged, numerous employers base a business decision exclusively on a protected 
class.  If this were the case, it would surely trigger quick litigation.  Moreover, the fact 
that the majority of discrimination cases are discharge cases makes the single motive 
argument even less persuasive. The company at least initially hired the terminated 
employee.  Unless there was a change in decision-making personnel, this means that 
the hiring employees were not racists or sexists when they first hired the employee, 
but became discriminators when they made termination decisions.  Employers 
typically rely on numerous factors in the employment context, many legitimate and, 
unfortunately, some unlawful.  There is another reason to argue against the 
bifurcated single-motive versus mixed-motive label.  Currently, judges decide to label 
the case before it goes to the jury.  We contend that whether the case is a single-
motive case (assuming this is possible) or mixed-motive case is a question for the 
jury. 
 119  Protecting Older Workers against Discrimination Act, H.R. 2852, 113th. Cong. 
(1st Sess. 2013). 
 120  Id. 
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than the other protected classes of discrimination.121 
III. EMPLOYER RETALIATION 
Retaliation cases have more than doubled in the last twenty years 
and there are now more retaliation claims than any other 
employment discrimination cause of action.122  As most employers 
know and employees come to understand, employees may not file 
discrimination charges in federal court without first filing such 
charges with either the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) or an affiliated state agency (commonly referred to as Fair 
Employment Practices Agencies (FEPA)).123  As a result, tracking the 
percentages of claims alleging violations of anti-discrimination 
employment statutes may be accomplished by analyzing EEOC or 
FEPA charge filing statistics.  In the 1980s and early 1990s, the EEOC 
and state FEPAs received about the same number of charges each 
year.124  FEPA charge data are often difficult to find and may be 
incomplete.  EEOC data, by contrast, are readily available and are 
more likely complete.  This is why we rely on EEOC data regarding 
enforcement of Title VII, ADEA, ADA, and the Equal Pay Act.  In the 
last twenty-one years, total employment discrimination charges filed 
with the EEOC have ranged from a low of 72,302 charges in 1992, to 
a high of 99,947 in 2011.125  In 2012, 99,412 charges were filed.126  
Because of this year-to-year fluctuation, using the raw numbers to 
evaluate which claims are most prevalent is not informative.  Instead, 
we analyze the percentage change in claims filed per year.  The 
largest single year-to-year percentage change occurred in Americans 
with Disabilities (ADA) claims filed in 1992 and 1993.127  Only 1.4% of 
 
 121  See ORWELL, supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 122  Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2013, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc
/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).  
 123  Filing a Charge of Discrimination, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/employees
/lawsuitcharge.cfm (last visited Jan. 4, 2014); Filing a Lawsuit, EEOC, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/lawsuit.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014); 
 124   Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2012, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov
/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014). 
 125  Charge Statistics FY 1992 Through FY 1996, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc
/statistics/enforcement/charges-a.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014); Charge Statistics FY 
1997 Through FY 2012, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics
/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014). 
 126  Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Reports Nearly 100,000 Job Bias Charges in Fiscal 
Year 2012 (Jan. 28, 2013), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc
/newsroom/release/1-28-13.cfm. 
 127   Charge Statistics FY 1992 Through FY 1996, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc
/statistics/enforcement/charges-a.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014); Charge Statistics FY 
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the cases filed in 1992 were ADA cases, but that number exploded to 
17.4% in 1993.128  This jump can be attributed to the ADA taking 
effect in July 1992.129  Beginning in 1993, the ADA cases have made 
up between 17.4% and 26.5% of EEOC filings.130  Besides disability, 
the greatest fluctuation in any claim based on a protected class was 
the 7.2% differential between ADEA cases filed in 1992 (27.1%) and 
the cases filed in 1995 (19.9 %).131  In 2012, ADEA cases made up 
23.0% of the total claims filed.132  These fluctuations may be the result 
of random variability.  In any event, little in the way of trends can be 
discerned in these statistics.  There is, however, one cause of action 
that exhibited a dramatic linear increase that is almost certainly non-
random—retaliation. 
In 1993, retaliation claims made up 15.7% of the total cases 
brought.133  By 2013, that percentage more than doubled to 41.1%.134  
In 2009, both retaliation and race accounted for 36% of the claims.  
Since 2010, retaliation cases have supplanted race as the most 
prevalent claim.135  Moreover, unlike any other category, retaliation’s 
percentages did not rise and fall throughout the time period in 
question.  Instead, except for a slight drop from 2001 to 2002 (27.5% 
to 27.0%), retaliation cases, as a percentage of total cases filed, rose 
each year.136 
The increase in the percentage of retaliation cases is not, as one 
would logically surmise, accompanied by a decrease in the 
 
1997 Through FY 2012, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics
/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014). 
 128  Charge Statistics FY 1992 Through FY 1996, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc
/statistics/enforcement/charges-a.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014). 
 129  Id. 
 130  Charge Statistics FY 1992 Through FY 1996, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc
/statistics/enforcement/charges-a.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014); Charge Statistics FY 
1997 Through FY 2012, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement
/charges.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014). 
 131  Charge Statistics FY 1992 Through FY 1996, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov
/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges-a.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014); Charge 
Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2012, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics
/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014). 
 132  Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2013, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc
/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014). 
 133  Charge Statistics FY 1992 Through FY 1996, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc
/statistics/enforcement/charges-a.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014). 
 134  Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2013, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc
/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014). 
 135  Id.  
 136  Id.  
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percentages of other employment discrimination claims.  The reason 
that the percentages can exceed 100 is that a single employee can 
allege discrimination under more than one cause of action.137  For 
example, assume that a forty-five year old African-American woman, 
who is Jewish and blind, files a charge against a potential employer 
who failed to hire her.  Based on one incident, this individual can 
allege discrimination based on age, race, sex, religion, and disability.  
Each theory of discrimination would be tallied despite the fact that 
they arose from a single charge filed. 
Between 1997 and 2012, the percentage of “cases” rose from 
145.6% to 170.3%.  Over the same time period, the percentage of 
retaliation cases rose 15.5%.138  While it is possible that the 15.5% 
increase in retaliation cases resulted from mostly stand-alone cases, a 
large portion of the increase is likely fueled by what some refer to as 
“tack-on” cases.  Retaliation tack-on cases are cases that allege a 
violation based on one of the seven protected classes with a 
retaliation case “tacked-on.” 
Tacking on additional claims to a complaint is relatively 
inexpensive.  The obvious benefit of tacking on claims is the creation 
of an additional basis from which to recover.139  As explained below, 
even if the underlying claim fails, employees may nonetheless 
succeed on a retaliation claim.  Retaliation claims may also augment 
the perceived legitimacy of underlying claims.  Plaintiffs alleging 
retaliation may be more likely to be regarded as having attempted to 
resolve a workplace problem without resort to the courts.  Such 
behaviors may appear reasonable to a fact finder, and they may 
reduce the impression that the plaintiff is only ex post attempting to 
extort money from an employer. 
In addition to serving as tack-on claims for plaintiffs in protected 
categories, retaliation is an attractive cause of action because an 
employee may file a complaint when he is not a member of a 
protected class affected by an underlying claim and when the only 
evidence of discrimination is the timing of an employer’s actions.140  
In this instance, retaliation opens the door to a number of arguably 
less meritorious claims.  Lawyers representing employers may argue 
 
 137  For example in 2012 the total percentages of claims were 170.1%.  Id. 
 138  Id.   
 139  Joan M. Savage, Note, Adopting the EEOC Deterrence Approach to the Adverse 
Employment Action Prong in a Prima Facie Case for Title VII Retaliation, 46 B.C. L. REV. 
215, 219 & n.36 (2004) (“Retaliation charges serve as independent legal claims, 
which do not depend on the validity of the underlying claim.”).  
 140  Id. at 219–20; see infra note 179 and accompanying text. 
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that employees make frivolous complaints of discrimination as a 
temporary means of establishing job security, particularly when the 
threat of losing one’s job is high.141  The supposed job security 
involves the likelihood of a stand-alone retaliation claim, which is the 
natural outgrowth of such a complaint.  It is not irrational for an 
employee with a job (as opposed to a career) to consider 
complaining about unlawful behavior as a form of insurance against 
an employer taking adverse employment action against him.  An 
inverse correlation likely exists between the degree to which an 
employee is in a job with few available alternatives and the likelihood 
of engagement in this type of behavior. 
On a more practical level, compared to discrimination, 
retaliation is easier for employees to identify and juries to 
understand.142  Discrimination can be subtle and difficult to interpret.  
Employees may wonder whether the employer is basing a decision on 
the employee’s protected class or because of a personal dislike or 
other non-discriminatory reason.  Retaliation, by definition, follows a 
complaint or another clear action,143 and the employee consequently 
feels confident in the reason for adverse treatment.  In addition, 
lawyers report that juries are often skeptical about discrimination.144  
Without a “smoking gun” evidencing a specific employer action or 
pattern, it is often difficult to convince a jury that the employer’s 
negative feelings about a protected class were so strong that that the 
employer was willing to take a discriminatory action and thereby risk 
the time, money, and negative publicity associated with a 
discrimination lawsuit.145  This is especially true in discharge cases in 
which it is often difficult for juries to accept that an employer hired a 
member of a protected class but then terminated the employee 
because of that same class.  It may seem illogical for an employer to 
not discriminate at the time of hiring the plaintiff but then to 
discriminate at the time of the employee’s discharge.  Alternatively, 
people tend to more readily appreciate that employers (and their 
 
 141  Proskauer’s Joe Baumgarten said as much at the Cornell Labor & 
Employment Roundtable in May of 2007. See supra note 103. 
 142  See B. Glenn George, Revenge, 83 TUL. L. REV. 439, 469 (2008) (“Because the 
juror can more easily project his or her own revenge or retaliation instinct in a 
similar situation, he or she may more easily conclude that retaliation played a role in 
the adverse decision made.”). 
 143  Retaliation, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/retaliation.cfm (last 
visited Feb. 15 2014). 
 144  See supra note 103. 
 145  See supra note 103; see also, Norton et al, supra note 55, at 37–38 (discussing 
why racial bias is a difficult thing to prove). 
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agents) may become upset and angry when being accused of 
discrimination, whether falsely or fairly, and therefore likely want to 
retaliate against the individual making those accusations.  Because it 
is easy for employees to identify and juries to understand, plaintiffs’ 
lawyers, acting as rational, self-interested actors that must decide 
whether to invest their time and money in each case with which they 
are presented, are often more interested in retaliation cases than 
other types of discrimination cases, all else being equal.146  A case in 
which the employee can identify unlawful actions based on an easily 
understandable unlawful motivation is more attractive to most jury 
members.147  Finally, as explained below, when using the pretext 
standard, retaliation cases are easier to prove than traditional 
discrimination cases. 
A. The Law of Employer Retaliation 
After Nassar, to establish a case of retaliation under either clause, 
employees must prove that they engaged in a “protected activity,” that 
they were discriminated against, and that there is a link between the 
protected activity and the adverse employment action.148 
A protected expression, for retaliation purposes, can occur 
under either the participation or the opposition clause.149  An 
employee invokes the participation clause when he or she takes part 
(e.g., as a party or witness) in a Title VII, ADEA, or ADA proceeding 
(e.g., agency investigation or litigation).150  The opposition clause 
applies to situations in which an employee complains that the 
employer violated a discrimination law.151  The complaint did not 
come as part of a discrimination proceeding and is instead based on 
an internal complaint, other notification to management, or even the 
filing of a claim.152  Regardless of which applies, it is important to note 
that the discrimination at issue does not have to involve the 
complaining employee.153  For example, a male employee who 
 
 146 See supra note 103. 
 147  See George, supra note 142, at 469 (“Because the juror can more easily project 
his or her own revenge or retaliation instinct in a similar situation, he or she may 
more easily conclude that retaliation played a role in the adverse decision made.”).  
 148  See Gonzalez v. Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co., 133 F.3d 1025, 1035 (7th Cir. 
1998). 
 149  George, supra note 142, at 446–51. 
 150  George, supra note 142, at 446–47 & nn.27–30.  
 151  George, supra note 142, at 447–50.  
 152  George, supra note 142, at 447–51.   
 153  George, supra note 142, at 447 (“[T]his protection extends not only to the 
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testifies at trial or complains to his employer that women are being 
sexually harassed has engaged in a protected expression under the 
participation or opposition clause.  Still, what constitutes a protected 
expression is sometimes a challenging question. 
In Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale and Retail Stores,154 the Fifth 
Circuit addressed the definition of a protected expression in 
opposition clause cases.  Employee Payne believed that his employer 
refused to hire people of color into positions in which the employees 
would have to handle money.155  Payne, who was temporarily laid off 
each summer, joined a civil-rights group that picketed in front of the 
employer’s store.156  After the picketing occurred, the employer did 
not rehire Payne, who alleged retaliation under the opposition 
clause.157  The employer argued that because Payne’s allegations of 
racial discrimination were unfounded, there could not be a protected 
expression.158  The employer asserted that employees could not 
succeed on a retaliation claim unless they proved that the underlying 
claim of employment discrimination did, in fact, occur.159 
In rejecting the employer’s argument, the court held that the 
employee engaged in a protected expression even if the underlying 
claim failed and the employer had not, in fact, violated the law.160  
Instead, the court explained, the employee need only have 
reasonable belief that the subject of the complaint was true.161  Other 
courts hold that to be protected, the expression must be in good faith 
as well as reasonable.162  An expression is considered to be held in 
good faith if the employee truly believes the alleged conduct 
occurred.  An employee has a reasonable belief if there is a basis on 
 
employee who filed the complaint but also to anyone who testifies or otherwise 
participates in the investigation or hearing.”). 
 154  654 F.2d 1130 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 155  Id. at 1135–36. 
 156  Id. at 1134–35.  
 157  Id. at 1135.  
 158  Id. at 1137.  
 159  Id. 
 160  Payne, 654 F.2d at 1137. 
 161  See id. at 1140 & n.11.  
 162  See, e.g., Little v. United Techs., Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956, 960 
(11th Cir. 1997) (“[A] plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of retaliation under 
the opposition clause of Title VII if he shows that he had a good faith, reasonable 
belief that the employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices . . . . A 
plaintiff must not only show that he subjectively (that is, in good faith) believed that 
his employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices, but also that his belief 
was objectively reasonable in light of the facts and record presented.”).  The court 
referred to a good faith belief as one that is “honest and bona fide.”  Id.   
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which to believe that the alleged conduct did occur, and if true, the 
conduct would violate the law.163 
The participation clause protects an employee who participates 
in any Title VII procedure regardless of the extent of such 
participation.164  In fact, the EEOC guidelines state that the 
protection under the participation clause applies to testifying, 
assisting, and preparing affidavits in conjunction with a proceeding 
or investigation under Title VII, ADEA, ADA, or EPA.165  These 
present very broad parameters on which to base a claim.  For 
instance, an employee who files an EEOC charge or who assists 
another in filing or preparing such a charge qualifies as being in a 
protected class.  This is the case even if the charge is not true, not 
reasonable, or not even brought in good faith.166  As the Second 
Circuit noted in Deravin v. Kerik, the participation clause “is expansive 
and seemingly contains no limitations.”167  No case illustrates this 
point more clearly than Merritt v. Dillard Paper Company.168  There, the 
Eleventh Circuit held that a company could not discharge an 
employee for his admitted sexual harassment when the admission 
occurred as part of testimony proffered in a Title VII case.169 
The application of the opposition and participation clauses 
makes sense: not requiring an opposing plaintiff to prove the truth of 
the underlying claim prevents the chilling effect of possible dismissal 
for speaking up.  If employees are protected only when they can 
prove that their employer violated the law, employees will be 
reluctant to use company harassment policies or otherwise complain 
about discrimination.  Because the Supreme Court, numerous lower 
courts, and commentators consistently contend that the key to 
ending discrimination is employee complaints followed by swift 
 
 163  Payne, 654 F.2d at 1140–41.  Payne reasonably believed McLemore’s hiring 
and promotional practices violated Title VII. Id. at 1141.  The minority position 
requires the plaintiff to hold a good-faith belief that the employer violated the law.  
See Ficus v. Triumph Grp. Operations, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1241 (D. Kan. 1998).   
 164  EEOC, Directives Transmittal, EEOC Compliance Manual, Vol. 2 § 8-II(C)(1), 
8-8–8-9, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/retal.pdf. 
 165  Id. at 8-2. 
 166  See, e.g., Parker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 652 F.2d 1012, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1981) 
(“The participation clause . . . has accordingly been interpreted as shielding recourse 
to the EEOC, regardless of the ultimate resolution of the underlying claim on its 
merits.”).  
 167  335 F.3d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 168  120 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 169  Id. at 1182. 
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employer action, this chilling effect needs to be curbed.170  Similarly, 
employees should not fear participating in EEOC investigations or 
litigation because of their perceptions that unlawful employer activity 
may not constitute violations of the discrimination law and thus, they 
could be terminated for such testimony. The competing incentives 
make it difficult to craft bright-line parameters that toe the line in 
this area without tipping the balance and yielding undesirable results 
in either direction. 
B. The Supreme Court’s Characterization of Employer Retaliation 
In the five years prior to Nassar, the Supreme Court issued three 
“employee friendly” retaliation decisions that made it easier for 
employees to prove retaliation.  What makes these cases relevant to 
the discussion here is that in two of the cases the Supreme Court 
expanded retaliation to include types of harm and classes of plaintiffs 
not protected in other statutes.  In Burlington Northern & Santa Fe 
Railway Company v. White,171 the Court held that, unlike the other 
protected classes, a plaintiff in a retaliation case did not have to suffer 
an adverse employment action.172  Instead, an employee simply had to 
prove that the employer’s response to a complaint of discrimination 
was one that would dissuade a reasonable person from complaining 
in the future.173  The theory underwriting the ruling seemed to accord 
with the principle that the best way to eradicate discrimination is to 
encourage employees to complain and that most impediments to 
such ability to complain would undermine this goal and should 
therefore be considered unlawful retaliation.174  After Burlington 
Northern, allegations of retaliation included conduct such as receiving 
the “cold shoulder” (being ignored),175 a poor performance 
evaluation,176 and issuance of a performance improvement plan.177  
 
 170  See, e.g., Wilson v. Moulison N. Corp., 639 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2011) (“[T]he 
company’s response was both swift and appropriate. After hearing the plaintiff’s 
complaint, [the company’s chief executive and owner] immediately looked into it, 
concluded that the misconduct had occurred, and reprimanded [the plaintiff’s 
coworkers] in very strong terms.”). 
 171  548 U.S. 53 (2006). 
 172  Id. at 67–70. 
 173  Id. (“[T]o retaliate by excluding an employee from a weekly training lunch 
that contributes significantly to the employee’s professional advancement might well 
deter a reasonable employee from complaining about discrimination.”). 
 174  See id.  
 175  Johnson v. Weld Cnty., 594 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 176  Weber v. Battista, 494 F.3d 179 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 177  Michael v. Caterpillar Fin. Servs. Corp., 496 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2007). 
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The Court’s decisions, taken together, imply that retaliation is more 
equal than the other protected classes. 
In Thompson v. North American Stainless,178 the Court took the 
application of this principle one step further by holding that a 
retaliation plaintiff need not even engage in a protected 
expression.179  In Thompson, the employer terminated the complaining 
employee’s fiancé.180  The Court applied the so-called “zone of 
interest” protection under which a complaining employee’s fiancé 
and, we presume, spouse, is protected from retaliation.181  Whether 
this logic similarly extends to siblings, parents, children, boyfriends, 
girlfriends, best friends, roommates, or other relationships will likely 
form the basis of litigation.  In Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t., 555 U.S. 271 
(2009), the third Supreme Court retaliation case, the Court held that 
an employee who, during an in-house investigation, stated that she 
had seen sexual harassment was opposing discrimination, despite the 
fact that she never complained and did not express any horror or 
even disgust.182  By expanding the definition of protected expression 
and discrimination, the retaliation trilogy—Crawford, Burlington 
Northern, Thompson, and Crawford v. Metropolitan Government, made 
retaliation even more attractive to plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ lawyers 
because both stand alone and tack-on retaliation cases are 
significantly easier to get to a jury.  Again, these cases stand for the 
principle that retaliation is more equal than other forms of unlawful 
employment discrimination. 
C. Retaliation Is More Equal Than Other Employment Discrimination 
Claims 
Similar to the Supreme Court, we also contend that retaliation 
differs from other causes of action in the employment discrimination 
context for two key reasons.  First, a truly innocent employer can not 
only have its business and reputation destroyed, but the law also 
forces the employer to continue to employ the person who seriously 
damaged the company.  An examination of the Payne case illustrates 
this point.183  Assume for the sake of illustration that Payne’s 
 
 178  131 S. Ct. 863 (2011). 
 179  Id. at 870. (“We know of no other context in which the words carry this 
artificially narrow meaning.”).  
 180  Id. at 867.  
 181  Id. at 870. 
 182  In Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t., 555 U.S. 271 (2009).  
 183  See supra notes 154–169 and accompanying discussion. 
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allegation was false, even though Payne believed it to be true.  
Assume further that the employer in Payne offered the money-related 
job in question to its two most senior employees, both of whom were 
individuals of color.  Assume that the two employees of color turned 
down the job.  The employer is disappointed but believed it was the 
employees’ decision to make and thus offered the position to the 
third most senior employee, a white employee, who accepts the job.  
Payne, however, has no way of knowing how the hiring decision was 
made.  Instead, Payne observes no people of color in positions in 
which employees handle money and jumps to a logical, albeit 
erroneous, conclusion that the two most senior employees, both of 
whom were African-American, were passed over for the open position 
in favor of a white employee.  Payne notifies the company and the 
EEOC of his belief that the employer violated the law (thus activating 
the opposition clause).  The EEOC investigates and soon the local 
newspaper publishes a front-page story about the investigation.  A 
protest ensues outside the employer’s front door, and people hold 
signs accusing the employer of being a racist.  Online media picks up 
the story too.  The employer’s business suffers, the owners’ standing 
in the community is diminished, and the owners’ families are 
attacked due to the false accusation.  Furious at being maligned, the 
owners do not wish to continue to employ the individual whose false 
accusations caused all of this pain and suffering.  They could not 
tolerate continuing to pay someone whose judgment they did not 
trust and someone whom they feel stabbed the company in the back. 
The owners want to terminate the employee but do not because 
the law prohibits it.  Several months after the complaint and the 
accompanying fall out, employee Payne violates company policy by 
providing his company discount to a friend.  The company has a strict 
policy of terminating employees who engage in such action and can 
prove that it has terminated several other employees who engaged in 
such conduct but had never complained about discrimination and 
were not part of the same protected class as Payne.  At trial the 
plaintiff’s attorney asks one of the company’s owners if the accusation 
of discrimination angered her and if she was relieved to have Payne 
off the payroll.  Regardless of how she answers, given the facts, we 
propose that most juries would infer that the owner was angry and is 
now relieved.  In fact, we contend that even if there was little fall out, 
most employers would not wish to continue to employ an individual 
who accused the company of reprehensible behavior, and thus, would 
be relieved at the opportunity to legitimately terminate such an 
individual’s employment.  This is a perfect cross-examination 
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question because no matter how the witness responds, the case is 
made for the plaintiff.  Either the jury will believe that the witness is 
lying if she says that she harbored no ill will towards Payne for 
accusing her of being a racist because that seems so implausible, or if 
the witness says she did harbor ill will towards Payne, the jury will 
think that the witness admitted having a retaliatory motive.  This 
illustrates our central point that retaliation claims are more equal 
than other employment discrimination claims.  No analogous Scylla 
and Charybdis cross-examination question like this one exists in 
other discrimination contexts; however, it is not clear whether and to 
what extent the hypothetical juror reaction posited here is 
empirically valid. 
It is likely that jurors will be quicker to infer retaliation than 
other protected classifications as motivating employer conduct.  This 
is because, as human beings, most people can relate to being 
motivated to retaliate against someone who wrongs you.  That instinct 
likely predates the Bible184 and may be a part of innate human nature 
across cultures.185  This obviously cannot be said of other motives for 
discrimination.  Particularly, as some have come to regard racial 
discrimination as becoming less prevalent, it is even more likely that 
individuals will be slower to impute racial motives to employer actions 
in the absence of direct evidence of discrimination.186  If a white 
employer failed to promote a Hispanic employee, how frequently 
would a jury infer that discrimination was a motivating factor?  
Conversely, all things equal, if an employer failed to promote an 
employee who complained that other employees were being racially 
discriminated and sexually harassed, how much more or less 
frequently would a jury infer that retaliation was a motivating factor?  
Keeping the facts almost identical, this is what we sought to find out 
by repeating our 2010 mock jury study but modifying the national 
original fact pattern used there to a claim of unlawful retaliation.  
 
 184  See Christopher Boehm, Retaliatory Violence in Human Prehistory, 51 BRIT. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 518 (2011). 
 185  See, e.g., Simon Gächter & Benedikt Herrmann, Reciprocity, Culture and Human 
Cooperation: Previous Insights and a New Cross-Cultural Experiment, 364 PHIL. 
TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOC’Y: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 791 (2009); Karl Sigmund, Punish 
or Perish? Retaliation and Collaboration among Humans, 22 TRENDS IN ECOLOGY & 
EVOLUTION 593 (2007); see also, Janice Nadler & Mary R. Rose, Victim Impact Testimony 
and the Psychology of Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 419 (2003) (discussing the 
retributive psychology of punishment and experimentally testing this in a laboratory 
setting).   
 186  See Jonathon Hunyor, Skin-deep: Proof and Inferences of Racial Discrimination in 
Employment, 25 SYDNEY L. REV. 535, 551–54 (2003).  
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Before discussing the results from our retaliation study, we briefly 
describe our prior national origin study. 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE OF THE IMPACT OF BURDENS OF PROOF 
ON JUROR DECISION MAKING 
Do employees alleging retaliation fare better at trial than 
employees alleging discrimination based on other protected classes?  
General methodological limits and problems specific to jury 
instruction research limit our ability to answer this question as 
definitively as we would like.  First, selection bias lurks, as not all 
litigated legal cases are reported,187 and the stream of cases that are 
reported is non-random.188  Second, the overwhelming majority of 
cases settle and, increasingly, settlements are confidential.189 Third, 
even if all employment discrimination lawsuits went to trial (and did 
not settle) and generated published legal opinions, factual, legal, and 
contextual variations across cases complicate efforts to generalize. 
Our prior research focused on whether the “motivating-factor” 
versus the “but-for” jury instruction influences case outcomes.190  
Using an experimental mock jury research design, our results 
demonstrated how jury instruction variations in the employment 
discrimination context can inform case outcomes.191  Assuming facts 
that could support the claim as much as deny it, employers have a 
substantially equal chance of prevailing in pretext and motivating 
factor cases, but we found a “non-trivial chance that a motivating 
factor instruction will result in costs and fees being awarded.”192  
Consequently, we suggested that employers are better off with a 
 
 187  See Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 
OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 246 (2001) (“The most important caveat that emerges from these 
[methodological] considerations is that appellate investigations in the employment 
discrimination area reflect a selection bias.”). 
 188  For example, the U.S. Courts of Appeals publish opinions only selectively, and 
the circuits follow different rules regarding unpublished opinions.  Ruth Colker, The 
Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L.  L. REV. 99, 
104–05 (1999) (noting the problems of statistical representation inherent in 
empirical analysis of appellate court decisions); see also Colker, supra note 187, at 
244–47. 
 189  The few exceptions include settlement agreements for class actions, claims 
filed by a governmental plaintiff, such as the EEOC, and, in some states, claims 
against a governmental defendant regarding public records. See Scott A. Moss, 
Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of Confidential Settlements, 105 MICH. L. 
REV. 867, 869–70 & nn.3–17 (2007). 
 190  See Sherwyn & Heise, supra note 13 at 931–44.  
 191  See Sherwyn & Heise, supra note 13 at 931–44.  
 192  Sherwyn & Heise, supra note 13 at 937. 
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pretext instruction than a motivating factor instruction.193 
To be sure, that differing burdens of proof generate different 
results does not by itself imply a problem.  If legitimate rationales 
support different proof burdens, different results would not only be 
acceptable, they would be desirable.  In fact, as an economic matter, 
burdens of proof should be constructed in civil litigation this way.194  
Regrettably, however, this is not the case.  After Costa and prior to 
Gross, there was no clear standard as to when courts would apply the 
motivating factor instruction and not the pretext instruction.  After 
Gross and Nassar, this problem remains in Title VII cases.  POWADA 
endeavors to provide equity for all protected classes by overturning 
Gross and Nassar and allowing employees to select their preferred 
method of proof in all discrimination cases.195  While the statute 
solves the problem of judicial (i.e., judges deciding when to allow the 
motivating factor instruction or not) and statutory inconsistency 
(treating age and disability differently than the other five protected 
classes), there are three problems that the statute either does not 
address or exacerbates.  First, should jurors unwittingly award 
thousands of dollars in costs and fees to plaintiffs?  Second, should 
employers that render legitimate business decisions be penalized for 
perceived illegitimate motivations?  In other words, should Congress 
penalize an employer if a jury infers (correctly or incorrectly) 
motivation based on the decision maker’s race, sex, or religion but 
agrees that the decision would have been made regardless of the 
protected class?  The third question—and the focus of this study—
involves whether retaliation should be included with other protected 
classes when it comes to the motivating factor jury instructions.  
Below, we posit that it should not. 
A. Experimental Mock Jury Studies 
We selected an experimental research design, specifically, a 
mock jury experiment, as the best available methodology to address 
the empirical challenges noted above.  Although mock jury studies 
are increasingly common in legal scholarship, the method warrants a 
brief discussion.  Mock jury studies endeavor to leverage the benefits 
 
 193  Id. at 937–38 (“Both [the motivating factor without the affirmative defense 
option and the full motivating factor option] . . . are less desirable than the pretext 
jury instruction for employers.”). 
 194  Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An 
Economic Perspective, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 413, 418–22 (1997). 
 195  Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, H.R. 3721, 111th Cong. 
(1st Sess. 2009).  
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of experimental research (such as manipulating key variables) while 
minimizing problems of ecological validity.196  When reviewing mock 
jury research, researchers have noted a variety of issues in which 
mock jury experiments were instrumental—juror characteristics, the 
effects of prejudicial pretrial news coverage, the use of impermissible 
information, jurors’ ability to understand standards of proof and 
instructions on the law, and deliberation phenomena, to name a 
few.197  Two experiments are described below detail to illustrate the 
process. 
Mock jury experiments have assisted research efforts to 
investigate the role of race in jury decision making.  A 2001 mock jury 
experiment, for example, examined the effect of racially-charged 
facts on white jurors’ biases in a criminal case.198  Researchers 
randomly distributed packets containing a trial summary, judicial 
instructions, and a questionnaire to white participants in an airport 
waiting area.199  Half of the summaries involved a white defendant and 
half involved a black defendant.200  Additionally, while half contained 
racially charged factual circumstances, racial tension was absent in 
the other half.201  Subjects rendered a verdict, recommended a 
sentence, and rated the strength of the prosecution’s and 
defendant’s cases.202  Statistical analyses illustrated that in race-neutral 
cases, white jurors more readily display anti-black bias than in racially 
 
 196  See generally David De Cremer and Daan Van Knippenberg, How Do Leaders 
Promote Cooperation? The Effects of Charisma and Procedural Fairness, 87 J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 858 (2002); Robert J. MacCoun, Comparing Legal Factfinders: Real and Mock, 
Amateur and Professional, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 511 (2005); Shari Seidman Diamond, 
Illuminations and Shadows from Jury Simulations, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 561 (1997).  
 197  See Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Judgments About Liability and Damages: 
Sources of Variability and Ways to Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 301 (1999); 
Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should) Make 
Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 9–44 (1997).  Mock jury studies have also been 
used to lend insight on important questions of how well decision makers understand 
certain kinds of evidence commonly presented to jurors.  See, e.g., D.H. Kaye and 
Jonathan J. Koehler, Can Jurors Understand Probabilistic Evidence?, 154 J. ROYAL STAT. 
SOC’Y 75 (1991).  
 198  Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An Investigation of 
Prejudice Against Black Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 
201, 214–26 (2001).  
 199  Id. at 216. 
 200  Id. 
 201  In the racially-charged version, the defendant was one of only two of his race 
on a basketball team and had suffered racial remarks and unfair criticism by 
teammates. The race-neutral version did not mention racial tension. However, all 
summaries identified the defendant’s race in a demographic information section.  Id. 
 202  Id. at 217. 
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charged cases.203  The authors hypothesized that the presence of race 
issues prompts jurors to conceal prejudice.204 
Researchers have also frequently turned to mock jury 
experiments to investigate jurors’ ability to disregard inadmissible 
evidence.205  A seminal mock jury study, part of the University of 
Chicago jury project, examined damage awards for a fictional 
automobile accident case.206  Three groups of participants listened to 
tape-recorded mock trials.207  In the first group’s recording, the 
defendant revealed he had no insurance, to no objection; in the 
second group, the defendant revealed he had insurance, to no 
objection; and in the third, the defendant revealed he had insurance, 
counsel objected, and the court directed the jury to disregard the 
statement.208  The average awards were $33,000, $37,000, and $46,000 
for the three groups, respectively.209  The study concluded that 
attention drawn to the defendant’s insurance coverage sensitized 
jurors to that fact and contributed to higher damage awards.210 
Mock jury experiments provide important advantages over post-
trial jury interviews and trial outcome quantitative analyses.  Notably, 
the ability to change one variable at a time permits researchers to 
gain purchase on mechanisms and relations among variables that are 
often otherwise unobservable using other empirical methodologies.211  
Nonetheless, the experimental approach is not without important 
limitations, mostly with the consequence of reduced external validity.  
Standard problems include the following: (1) mock jurors are often 
students rather than a more representative general population 
sample; (2) facts are presented in writing or by video or audio 
recording rather than through a live trial; (3) verdicts lack real-world 
consequences; and, most often, (4) the absence of group (jury-room) 
 
 203  Id. at 220. 
 204  Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 198, at 220. 
 205  See Koehler and Kaye, supra note 197. 
 206  See Dale W. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744, 
753 (1959). 
 207  Id. 
 208  Id. at 753–54.  
 209  Id. at 754. 
 210  Id.  But see Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Damage Anchors on Real Juries, 8 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 148 (2011) (suggesting that jurors are less sensitive to 
plaintiffs’ damage award demands, in spite of the theoretically plausible existence of 
strong anchoring effects).  
 211  Seidman Diamond et al, supra note 197, at 302–03; Samuel R. Sommers and 
Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know About Race and Juries? A Review of 
Social Science Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997, 1002–03 (2003).  
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deliberation.212 
The degree to which student mock jurors attenuate external 
validity is unclear.  For example, studies examining the use of 
students have found “little or no difference in . . . verdicts by student 
and adult jury-eligible respondents for the same cases.”213  A meta-
analysis of twenty years of jury simulations found no conclusive 
differences between student and non-student participants.214  Where 
infrequent differences arose, students demonstrated a slight 
preference against criminal conviction and for defendant civil 
liability.215 
Although the absence of real-world consequences in mock jury 
experiments certainly limits external validity, results from studies of 
how actual and mock-jury study findings differ are mixed.216  For 
example, of the five studies discussed in the Bornstein and McCabe 
Article, one study found the absence of real-life consequences 
increased conviction rates, another study found the opposite effect, 
and the remaining three found no main effect at all.217  Regardless, 
difficulties associated with studying—let alone manipulating—jury 
behavior make access to such data not readily feasible. 
The absence of group deliberations, however, perhaps poses the 
greatest threat.  Fieldwork examined by a 2001 meta-analysis suggests 
that in 10 percent of trials, a jury majority will change post-
deliberation.218  Deliberation comes at a cost, however—it requires 
more time and reduces sample size to one verdict for every six, eight, 
or twelve subjects, resulting in greater expense per unit of analysis.  
We tried to mitigate this problem by first having groups of six 
deliberate as one body.  After deliberations were complete, the 
students then filled out the special jury verdict sheet on their own.  
Altogether, limitations notwithstanding, mock jury experiments are a 
necessary first step in designing more expensive and elaborate studies 
 
 212  See Saks, supra note 197, at 7. 
 213  Robert J. MacCoun, Experimental Research on Jury Decision-Making, 244 SCI. 1046, 
1046 (1989). 
 214  Brian H. Bornstein, The Ecological Validity of Jury Simulations: Is the Jury Still 
Out?, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 75, 77–80 (1999).  
 215  Id. at 80. 
 216  Brian H. Bornstein & Sean G. McCabe, Jurors of the Absurd? The Role of 
Consequentiality in Jury Simulation Research, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 443, 452 (2005). 
 217  Id. at 453 Table 1. 
 218  Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on 
Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622, 701 (2001). 
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that examine deliberation.219 
B. Jury Instruction Studies in the Employment Discrimination Context 
In an effort to enhance external validity, our experiment used 
case statements constructed (and used) by experienced employment 
discrimination specialists at a leading New York City law firm.220  
Before describing our experimental design, we first describe the jury 
instructions and special verdict sheets used in our study. 
One problem with studying jury instructions is the variation in 
real-world jury instructions used by judges.  In some jurisdictions, 
judges are permitted to develop their own proprietary jury 
instructions, as long as they accord with settled law.  Judges typically 
ask each party to draft proposed jury instructions and then choose 
one of the two proposals or draft a third version themselves.  Other 
jurisdictions have established model jury instructions that are 
routinely deployed.221  These jury instructions are accompanied by 
“special jury verdict sheets.”  This study exploits sample 
discrimination jury instructions and special verdict sheets that the 
Northern District of Illinois made publicly available.  Appendix A 
contains the jury instructions and special verdict sheets used in this 
study.222 
 
 219  Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 198, at 224. 
 220  Founded in 1875, Proskauer, Rose LLP is a full service law firm with offices in 
New York, New Jersey, Florida, Los Angeles, Boston, Chicago, New Orleans, 
Washington D.C., and throughout the world.  Proskauer,  
About Us, http://www.proskauer.com/about/ (last visited Feb. 1. 2014).  
 221  See, e.g., Lopez v. Mendez, 432 F.3d 829, 835 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding no error 
in the trial court’s determination that an applicable Arkansas Model Jury Instruction 
stated Arkansas law correctly); Gatlin v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 481 S.W. 2d 338, 
340–41 (Ark. 1972) (finding error where the trial court substituted its own 
instruction for an applicable Arkansas Model Jury Instruction without stating the 
basis for refusal); Irwin v. Omar Bakeries, Inc., 198 N.E.2d 700, 704–05 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1964) (finding no error where the trial court did not use a specific Illinois Pattern 
Jury Instruction that the court determined was inapplicable); Means v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 550 S.W. 2d 780, 786–87 (Mo. 1977) (finding no error where the 
trial court modified the Missouri Approved Jury Instruction to apply it to the case 
facts); Anderson v. Welsh, 527 P.2d 1079, 1086–87 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974) (finding 
non-prejudicial error where the trial court gave not only the applicable Uniform Jury 
Instruction but additional inapplicable Uniform Jury Instructions).  
 222  FED. CIV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIR., § 3.01 & cmt. c (Comm. on 
Pattern Civ. Jury Instructions of the Seventh Cir., Draft, Oct. 2004), available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20050120184720/www.ca7.uscourts.gov/Rules 
/pjury_civil_draft.pdf.  
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C. Experimental Evidence on Employer Retaliation 
While we previously argued, and currently argue, that disability 
and age should fall under the same standard as sex, race, color, 
national origin, and religion,223 we contend that retaliation is 
different.  Since most discrimination cases are discharge cases, there 
is a strong argument that the protected class is irrelevant, or at least 
less relevant.  We begin from the truism that a company may not 
discharge an employee who is a member of a protected class (e.g., 
gender, race, or religious group) without having hired this employee 
in the first instance.  So, before any additional facts are added, on its 
face, it is difficult to explain why an employer would offer 
employment to an employee in a protected class at some expense, 
risking liability, and then take an adverse employment action against 
that person with animus against him because of the protected class 
some time later.  At least, one may say that the logic may seem 
inconsistent and the explanation for the adverse employment action 
may not be obvious on its face.  Such logic, of course, has critical 
limitations.  For example, the actors making hiring decisions are not 
necessarily those responsible for the allegedly adverse employment 
actions, or certain protected groups could be judged under different 
standards.  Still, absent evidence to support the plaintiff, it seems 
unlikely that juries will more often than not presume that the 
protected class “motivated” the employer.  Conversely, we propose 
that a person terminated or denied a promotion after making a 
complaint of discrimination is in a very different position.  Retaliation 
plaintiffs’ status changes during employment.  By engaging in 
protected expression, such plaintiffs land in a protected class they 
were not in upon hire.  Thus, the jury is not perplexed as to how the 
employer hired a person in a protected class and subsequently 
became, for example, a sexist, racist, or ageist.  In such contexts, we 
suggest the possibility that juries will likely find that retaliation 
motivated the employer.  Results from our study comport with this 
suggestion. 
We replicated our 2010 study with a few key changes.  Instead of 
a national origin case, we used a retaliation case.  We altered the 
name of the plaintiff so that it sounded more similar (or familiar) to 
the decision makers (employer).  We also slightly modified the fact 
pattern.  In the new fact pattern, the plaintiff, a senior employee, was 
approached by coworkers who believed that their supervisor sexually 
 
 223  See generally Sherwyn & Heise, supra note 13.  
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harassed women and discriminated against African Americans.  The 
plaintiff engaged in a protected expression by telling the supervisor 
that he sexually harassed and discriminated against employees.  We 
also altered the jury instructions and the special jury verdict sheet to 
reflect the employee’s retaliation claim. 
To enhance replicability, our current study otherwise matches 
our past study.  In both studies, the subjects were Cornell University 
undergraduate students, with the vast majority enrolled in a 
management program.  The statement of the case was delivered by 
associates from a New York City law firm, and the subjects reviewed 
the materials under conditions similar to the prior study.  This time, 
we did not vary the kind of jury instructions that the subjects 
reviewed.  Instead, all participants received the motivating-factor 
instruction.  Some key results differed between the two studies.  
These are discussed below. 
D. The Experiment 
Senior litigation associates from Proskauer Rose’s New York City 
office developed a standard employment discrimination scenario.  
Specifically, in the scenario, a plaintiff alleged his employer retaliated 
against him by denying him a promotion for complaining about 
sexual harassment and racial discrimination in the workplace.  
Cornell University undergraduate students (N=128) served as mock 
jurors.224  All subjects received an identical presentation of the case 
statement.  At two different times, participants watched the case 
statements on large video screens in a lecture hall.  We showed the 
plaintiff’s statement first and then immediately showed the 
defendant’s statement.  Subjects were then provided a motivating 
factor jury instruction.  After hearing the jury instructions, 
participants were randomly assigned into groups of six and provided 
special jury verdict sheets.  They were given twenty minutes to 
deliberate. After concluding their deliberations, subjects were asked 
to fill out individual verdict forms.225 
Table 1 presents salient respondent demographics.  Just over 
one-half were female and most were white.  The majority of non-
white students were Asian.  Moreover, just over one-half of the 
 
 224  Most of the participating students were attending Cornell’s School of Hotel 
Administration. 
 225  To minimize underreporting and esteem-based influences, the experiment 
was conducted in a large auditorium classroom.  Special jury verdict forms were 
completed anonymously. 
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subjects came from households in which reported annual family 
income exceeded $250,000.  White subjects from homes with the 
highest annual family income (in excess of $250,000) comprised 35.5 
percent of the sample. 
 
TABLE 1: RESPONDENTS’ SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
 % (N)
 
All Respondents 
 
128 
  
Gender: 94
 Female 54.3
  
Race/Ethnicity: 92
 White 68.5
 Non-White 31.5
 Hispanic 1.1
 Mixed 9.8
 Asian 18.5
 Black 1.1
 [other] 1.1
  
Annual Family Income: 93
 $50K or less 5.4
 $51K—$100K 9.7
 $101K—$150K 9.7
 $151K—$200K 14.0
 $201K—$250K 10.8
 More than $250K 50.5
  
Prior work experience 98.9 93
  
Interaction: 93
  White-highest income 35.5
  
 
E. Results and Discussion 
Table 2 reports the main findings.  More than 59 percent of the 
jurors agreed that the plaintiff (employee) successfully established 
that retaliation from plaintiff’s complaints about sexual and racial 
discrimination in the workplace was a motivating factor in the 
employer’s failure to promote plaintiff resulted from.  The difference 
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between jurors’ “yes” and “no” votes is statistically significant.226  
Moreover, while 59 percent of the jurors found that retaliation 
motivated the employer, results in Tables 2 and 4 demonstrate that 
only 9.3 percent (12/128) of jurors found that the employer failed to 
prove that it would have made the same decision regardless of 
retaliation.  Overall, our results, while merely descriptive and 
experimental, illustrate how the two-question motivating-factor 
instruction results in the majority of jurors awarding the plaintiff 
attorneys’ fees and litigation costs even when the jurors believe that 
the plaintiff did not deserve damages. 
To assess whether jurors’ background characteristics inform 
jurors’ assessment of the plaintiff’s retaliation claim, additional 
analyses considered the potential influence of gender, race, and 
family income.  While assessing various juror sub-pools reduces 
statistical power, it is still worth noting that none of these listed 
individual characteristics are statistically significantly associated with 
juror decision rendering. 
 
TABLE 2: SUBJECTS’ JURY VERDICTS: PLAINTIFF ESTABLISHED 
RETALIATION CLAIM 
  
Yes No Sig. (N) 
 
Total 76 52 * 128 
Gender:   
  Female 23 28 51
  Male 26 17 43
Race:   
  White 30 33 63
  Non-white 17 12 29
Family Income:   
  Less than $250K 24 22 46
  More than $250K 24 23 47
Interactions:   
  White, highest income 16 17 33
  Non-white, highest income
 
32 28 60
   NOTE: * p < 0.05. 
 
 
 
 226  P= 0.041 (two-tailed binominal distribution test). 
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To provide additional context, we compare our main result in 
Table 2 with results from prior research on a similar—though 
distinct—issue.  Over a two-year period in the early 2000’s we ran a 
similar experiment drawing from the same pool of subjects 
(undergraduate students attending Cornell University) that focused 
on an employee’s claim that national origin discrimination was the 
reason that his employer failed to promote the plaintiff.227  In that 
study, jurors were provided with either: (1) the full motivating-factor 
jury instruction and special jury verdict sheet; (2) the motivating-
factor instruction without the second question (i.e. the employer’s 
affirmative defense that it would have made the same decision 
regardless of national origin); or (3) the so-called “but-for” jury 
instruction and special verdict jury sheet.  The purpose of that study 
was to determine whether the different instructions affected 
outcomes.  We found that there was no statistically significant 
difference between the full motivating-factor instruction and the 
“but-for” instruction when it came to the ultimate question of 
whether the employee was entitled to damages.  We did find, 
however, that there was a significant difference between the first 
question in the motivating-factor special jury verdict sheet and the 
one and only “but for” question.  Because answering the first question 
in the motivating-factor scheme results in costs and fees, the 
difference was not only statistically different, but it also carried 
important practical legal consequences. 
In our current study, we explored whether simply changing the 
employment discrimination claim from national origin to retaliation 
would influence juror results.  By replicating the general nature of 
the factual case and, insofar as our experimental juror population 
remained essentially constant, we sought to control the influence of 
salient background variables.  On the ultimate question of whether 
the employee was entitled to damages, we did not expect a major 
change in how jurors ruled.  Results on the employee damages 
question generally comported with our expectations.  While the 
percentage of jurors awarding full damages to the complaining 
employee increased (from 6.3 percent to 9.3 percent), such an 
increase strikes us as de minimus (though suggestive).  Insofar as we 
feel the underlying nature of employee retaliation claims 
fundamentally differs from that of national origin claims in the 
employment discrimination litigation context, we expected to find 
different juror outcomes.  Results from our two studies comport with 
 
 227  See Sherwyn & Heise, supra note 11. 
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these expectations. 
Table 3 presents core results from the two separate studies and 
illustrates the important difference regarding how the mock jurors 
answered the motivating-factor question.  In 2010, just over 40 
percent of the mock jurors concluded that the employee successfully 
established that discrimination based on national origin motivated 
the employer.  In 2013, however, almost 60 percent of the mock 
jurors concluded that the employee established that retaliation 
motivated the employer.  While it is true that a few years separate 
these two experiments, there is little, if any, reason to expect that 
students drawn from the same underlying population would behave 
differently in the two experiments.  We are unaware of any material 
changes in terms of the composition of Cornell University 
undergraduates over these years.  Rather, differences in the nature of 
the employment discrimination claims (national origin versus 
retaliation) more likely account for the increase (from 40.1 percent 
to 59.4 percent) in jurors concluding that the complaining employee 
successfully established its legal claim. 
 
TABLE 3: SUBJECTS’ JURY VERDICTS: PLAINTIFF ESTABLISHED 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIM 
 (1)
National Origin 
(2010) 
(2)
Retaliation 
(2013) 
 
Yes 40.1% 59.4% 
No 59.9% 40.6%
 
(N) 142 128 
  
 
NOTES: Values in column 1 derive from our 2010 study of jury instructions’ 
influence in a national origin employment discrimination claim.  Values in column 2 
come from row 1 in Table 2, supra. 
SOURCE: Sherwyn & Heise, supra note 11 (column 1). 
 
For the fifty-two mock jurors who concluded that the plaintiff 
failed to establish that retaliation was a motivating factor, their work 
as a juror ended.  The remaining seventy-six mock jurors, who 
concluded that the plaintiff successfully established that retaliation 
motivated the employer, proceeded on to question 2 on the juror 
special verdict form.  Question 2 asks whether the defendant 
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(employer) successfully established that its decision not to promote 
the employee was made independently of the employee’s sexual and 
racial workplace harassment claims.  As the results in Table 4 make 
clear, over 84 percent of the jurors agreed with the employer’s 
(defendant’s) claim that the employer would have made the same 
decision regardless of retaliation.  Similar to the results in question 1, 
the difference between jurors’ “yes” and “no” votes in question 2 is 
statistically significant.228  Also, similar to the results in question 1, 
none of the results involving demographic characteristics are 
statistically significantly associated with juror decision making. 
 
TABLE 4: SUBJECTS’ JURY VERDICTS (PART 2): DEFENDANT 
ESTABLISHED NO PLAINTIFF PROMOTION DESPITE PLAINTIFF 
DISCRIMINATION CLAIM 
  
Yes No Sig. (N) 
 
Total 64 12 ** 76 
Gender:   
  Female 17 6 23
  Male 24 2 26
Race:   
  White 27 3 30
  Non-white 12 5 17
Family Income:   
  Less than $250K 19 5 24
  More than $250K 21 3 24
Interactions:   
  White, highest income 15 1 16
  Non-white, highest income
 
25 7 32
NOTE: ** p < 0.01. 
 
Insofar as all but one of our respondents already benefit from 
employment experience and all are enrolled in a management 
preparation program, our sample drawn from a population of 
undergraduate students might represent a more traditional 
management perspective.  Moreover, while the experienced New 
York City employment lawyers who drafted the factual scenario used 
in both of our studies attempted to make the case a very close call 
legally, they had represented the employer in the actual case and thus 
 
 228  P < 0.001 (two-tailed binominal distribution test). 
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had developed and lived with the employer’s strategies and theories 
of the case.  Thus, it is likely that both the sample of mock jurors and 
the source of the factual scenario are predisposed to side with 
management.  Despite a likely net bias favoring the employer, 
however, almost 60 percent of our jurors awarded either full damages 
or costs and fees to the employee. 
These results greatly affect the three concerns articulated above.  
First, employers are penalized for their thoughts, not their actions.  
An employer who would not have promoted the hypothetical plaintiff 
regardless of his complaints is still found liable for costs and fees.  
Congress determined that even being motivated by race, sex, color, 
religion, or national origin is unlawful and worthy of declaratory 
judgment as well as costs and fees.  It seems that Congress wants to 
create a world in which these protected characteristics do not even 
cross an employer’s mind.  This is a laudable goal and we agree that 
the world would be a better place if this lack of prejudice became 
standard behavior.  We contend this is not the case in retaliation.  As 
noted above, retaliation is a biologically engrained human response 
to negative stimuli.229  Is it reasonable to suggest that humans have 
evolved to the point where a plaintiff’s good faith and reasonable, but 
false, accusation of reprehensible behavior (like sexual harassment or 
racial discrimination) will not factor into a decision maker’s motives?  
Is this a goal that we should pursue so that those who do not let such 
actions be a but for cause, but do let it play a role in a decision, are 
guilty of discrimination and need to suffer financial and social 
consequences? 
Second, the jury does not know that checking the box for 
motivating factor results in costs and fees.  In fact, several students 
remarked that “yes / yes = no.”  In terms of damages, it does.  In 
discrimination cases, however, costs and fees can greatly exceed back 
pay.  Thus, this kind of special jury verdict sheet can functionally 
mislead jurors.  This is particularly problematic given the likely way in 
which jurors endogenously consider damage awards with their 
determination of the merits of a case.  For instance, Hans and Reyna 
posit that jurors first make a categorical “gist judgment” that money 
damages are warranted and then make an ordinal gist judgment 
ranking the damages deserved as low, medium, or high.230  If this is 
 
 229  See supra Part III.C. 
 230  Valerie P. Hans & Valerie F. Reyna, To Dollars from Sense: Qualitative to 
Quantitative Translation in Jury Damage Awards, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 120, 120 
(2011). 
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the case, the findings in this study are even more problematic.231 
This issue is not limited to retaliation, but our third concern 
shows that retaliation exacerbates the problem.  In the 2010 study, 40 
percent of the mock jurors found that national origin motivated the 
employer.232  With an almost identical fact pattern, 60 percent of the 
mock jurors in the instant study found retaliation motivated the 
employer.  In addition, fifty percent of the mock jurors found that 
retaliation motivated the employer, but it would have made the same 
decision regardless.  In our 2010 study, only 34 percent of the jurors 
ruled the same way.233  The stark contrast in these numbers supports 
our contention that retaliation differs in important ways from other 
protected employee classes.  The fact that our sample of mock jurors 
likely skews in a direction that favors employers only deepens the 
concerns.  If POWADA passes, it seems highly likely that the vast 
majority of retaliation plaintiffs will successfully obtain at the very least 
cost and fees.  If so, this should stimulate employee retaliation claims, 
particularly from employees uneasy with their job security. By 
pushing retaliation claims, strategic employees can exploit employers’ 
aversion to increased legal uncertainty and exposure.  Moreover, this 
might also prompt judges to look more favorably on employers’ 
summary judgment motions owing to fears—real or perceived—
about cost and fees awards.  Judges may also increasingly deny costs 
and fees despite jury findings.  In reality, employers faced with 
retaliation claims will settle a greater percentage of cases and for 
higher amounts. These settlements will, in turn, fuel further 
litigation.  To dampen the likely tide of retaliation claims, employers 
could reduce avenues to complain of discrimination as such 
complaints will be too costly or seek to create a more homogeneous 
workforce in which complaints will carry less weight.  Fewer 
complaints and an incentive to avoid diversity will perpetuate 
discrimination.  This is an admittedly pessimistic and unfortunate 
vicious cycle. 
 
 
 231  Another recent article suggests that this result is problematic because it belies 
the extent to which fact-finders try to establish “the truth, rather than a statistical 
surrogate of the truth, while securing the appropriate allocation of the risk of error.”  
Ronald J. Allen & Alex Stein, Evidence, Probability, and the Burden of Proof, 55 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 557, 557–602 (2013). 
 232  Sherwyn & Heise, supra note 13, at 934 Table 1. 
 233  Sherwyn & Heise, supra note 13, at 934 & Tables 1 & 2. 
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V.  CONCLUSION: START MAKING SENSE 
We suggest three fixes to the challenges outlined above flowing 
from POWADA’s proposal to extend the mixed-motive jury 
instruction in employer retaliation discrimination cases.  First, 
Congress could return to the Price Waterhouse holding and not award 
costs and fees for motivations that do not pass the “but for” causation 
test.  This is a value judgment of whether motivations that do not 
really impact employers’ decisions should be unlawful.  If so, should 
the plaintiffs’ lawyers be compensated for bringing cases in which 
protected categories form non-determinative motivations in adverse 
employment actions?  Second, juries should be informed that 
checking the motivating factor box will lead to awarding plaintiffs 
costs and fees.  At least then juror will be aware of the consequences 
of their decisions.  There is an important policy concern associated 
with this response.  Should decision makers be aware of the monetary 
consequences of fact finding, or is it better to let them blindly assess 
facts and leave to judges the consequences of those findings?  The 
third option is to simply accept that retaliation is equal, but that some 
kinds of employment claims are less equal than others and to exclude 
it from POWADA. 
While we contend that either of the first two steps would resolve 
problems, neither is necessary.  Smoking gun evidence supporting 
discrimination claims is less common now.  It is difficult to prove 
discrimination, and thus, the motivating factor scheme provides 
plaintiffs a reasonable chance to prevail.  This is not the case with 
retaliation, however.  The motivating-factor scheme will unduly 
increase the prospects for costs and fees awarded employees.  Even 
now, employment lawyers warn employers not to try to “save” a 
struggling employee.234  Once the employee receives a performance 
improvement plan, the employee knows it is time to file a claim and 
buy six to eight months of fear-based employment.235  Fear-based 
employment occurs when the employer fears the costs of termination 
more than the costs of an unproductive or disruptive employee.  
From a social standpoint, this not a positive development—people 
often need coaching to perform in a job.  POWADA would further 
discourage employers to help poor performing employees.  The 
potential negatives outweigh the benefit of penalizing employers for 
retaliatory impulses. 
 
 234  Gregg A. Gilman, Partner, Davis & Gilbert LLP, Remarks at 6th Annual HR in 
Hospitality Conference, Las Vegas, Nevada (Mar. 2013).   
 235  Id. 
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We propose that the categories of age and disability be treated 
like all other protected classes.  There is neither a statutory nor 
logical basis to distinguish age and disability from other traditionally 
protected employee classes.  In contrast, employer retaliation is 
different and, as such, should be treated differently by employment 
discrimination doctrine. 
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Appendix A 
 
Special Verdict Sheet: 
________________________________X 
Dennis Ferguson, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
– against –          
                                                              SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
ROCHESTER CHRONICLE, INC., 
 
 Defendant. 
_________________________________X 
1. Did plaintiff Dennis Ferguson establish by a preponderance of 
the evidence that retaliation for his complaints of sexual harassment 
and racial discrimination was a motivating factor in the decision by 
defendant, Rochester Chronicle, Inc., not to offer him a promotion 
in December 2009? 
 
Yes  ____No  ____ 
 
You should answer the next question only if you answered “yes” 
to Question 1.  If you answered Question 1 “no,” you should not 
answer any further questions but sign this special verdict form on the 
last page and return the form to the clerk. 
 
2. Did defendant establish by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the defendant would have treated plaintiff the same way even if 
retaliation for plaintiff’s complaints of sexual harassment and racial 
discrimination had not played any role in the employment decision? 
 
Yes ____ No ____ 
 
If you answered “yes” to Question 2, sign the special verdict form on 
the last page.  If you answered “no” to Question 2, plaintiff is entitled 
to recover back pay damages.  The parties have stipulated that the 
total amount of back pay to be awarded to plaintiff is $75,000.  Check 
the box below to signify that the plaintiff is entitled to damages of 
$75,000 and then sign the special verdict form. 
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Plaintiff is entitled to back pay in the amount of $75,000.  _____ 
 
SIGNED: 
 
 
Please answer the following questions: 
 
1. Gender: M  F 
 
2. Race / National Origin: 
 
3. Have you worked for an employer?: Y  N 
 
4. Family Income: 
 
a. Under $50,000 
 
b. $51,000-$100,000 
 
c. $101,000-150,000 
 
d. $151-$200,000 
 
e. $201,000-$250,000 
 
f. O ver $250,000 
 
